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Journal of Resources and Ecology >

2025 , Vol. 16 >Issue 3: 702 - 714

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2025.03.008

Human Activities and Sustainable Development

How Does Villager Participation Influence the Efficiency of Improvements to the Rural Human Settlement Environment?

  • LIN Limei , 1 ,
  • ZHANG Yuedong 2 ,
  • LI Jun 3 ,
  • LAI Yongbo , 1, *
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  • 1. School of Public Affairs, Fujian Jiangxia University, Fuzhou 350108, China
  • 2. School of Government, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
  • 3. School of Business Administration, Fujian Jiangxia University, Fuzhou 350108, China
* LAI Yongbo, E-mail:

LIN Limei, E-mail:

Received date: 2024-12-03

  Accepted date: 2025-03-20

  Online published: 2025-05-28

Supported by

Key Project of the National Social Science Fund(24ASH010)

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Abstract

The governance of rural human settlements has long relied on a government-led model, leading to the dilemma of high costs and low effectiveness. Although farmer participation is regarded as crucial for improving governance efficiency, its specific pathways of influence remain unclear. This study constructed a theoretical framework to analyze how farmer participation affects the efficiency of village-level human settlement governance. Based on survey data from 1401 farmers and 192 villages in Northwest Fujian Province, this study employed the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method to measure governance efficiency, used the Tobit model to explore the pathways of impacts from farmer participation, and established a mediation effect model to test the intermediary roles of democratic supervision and demand responsiveness. Key findings: (1) Farmer participation enhances the governance efficiency of rural human settlements through the logical chain of “empowerment” - “government-society interaction” - “common governance”. (2) Democratic supervision and demand responsiveness exhibit significant mediation effects, indicating that farmer participation improves governance efficiency by activating these mechanisms. Policy implications: Farmer participation, reinforced by democratic supervision and demand-responsive mechanisms, serves as an endogenous driver for enhancing governance efficiency. Policy design should focus on institutionalizing participatory channels, optimizing closed-loop demand-response systems, and strengthening the environmental protection capacities of farmers. Future research should be extended to regional comparisons and dynamic effect analyses to validate the universality of these mechanisms.

Key words： environmental governance; farmer participation; government-society interaction; democratic supervision; demand response

Cite this article

LIN Limei , ZHANG Yuedong , LI Jun , LAI Yongbo . How Does Villager Participation Influence the Efficiency of Improvements to the Rural Human Settlement Environment?[J]. Journal of Resources and Ecology, 2025 , 16(3) : 702 -714 . DOI: 10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2025.03.008

1 Introduction

Finding a robust way to realize regular and efficient governance has been a key challenge for rural habitat improvement. In the government-led and financial investment-based governance model, the current environmental governance of rural human settlements presents quick results and extensive coverage, yet it solely relies on local financial investment and the village collective economy is insufficient for long-term sustainability (Osborn and Datta, 2006). Rural habitat management transcends mere environmental reme-diation or social issue containment; it encompasses the multifaceted aspects of the daily lives of farmers (Huang et al., 2023). The administrative-led path will always be caught in the trap of the high cost and low effectiveness of “over densification” (Pan et al., 2024). In this regard, Chinese leaders proposed to “improve farmer participation and long-term management and care mechanisms” in the management of rural human settlements in 2024.
Therefore, harnessing the endogenous strength of villages, fostering the active involvement of farmers as the primary stakeholders, and expanding the scope and depth of their participation have emerged as pivotal strategies for amplifying the effectiveness of rural human settlement governance (Peng et al., 2023). To address this issue, scholars have deeply investigated the key factors affecting farmer participation (Liu and Tao, 2012; Li et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2021) and explained the phenomenon of the “collective inaction” of farmers in rural habitat governance (Wang et al., 2016a; Du et al., 2020; Stotten et al., 2021). They have also analyzed the action-oriented logic of farmer participation in governance processes (Osborn and Datta, 2006) and the logic of effective government mobilization, while proposing various optimization strategies, including reshaping autonomy orders (Zhou et al., 2020), realizing environmental collective governance by farmers (Dik et al., 2023), adopting multicenter synergistic governance (Du et al., 2020), and a range of other initiatives.
However, recognizing that farmer participation alone does not automatically translate into effective governance is crucial. For instance, while farmer participation has been introduced in agricultural land remediation efforts, it often remains formalistic, resulting in suboptimal outcomes (Wang et al., 2016b). Consequently, the real challenge lies in enhancing the efficiency of rural habitat governance through the meaningful and effective participation of farmers. This has led to a series of questions that are worth exploring: Can the participation of farmers bolster the efficiency of village human settlement governance, and if so how? What is the logic and internal mechanism? This is not only an effective expansion of theoretical research on the participation of farmers in the governance of rural public affairs but also has practical significance for exploring the efficient governance of rural human settlements.
This study may have marginal contributions in three areas. The first is theoretical contributions. This article proposes an analytical framework of “empowerment and capacity enhancement-government-society interaction- co-governance and efficiency increase” for farmer participation in rural human settlement management. It deepens our understanding of “government-society interaction” and refines the mechanisms of democratic supervision and demand response from the perspective of farmers, thereby expanding the theoretical research on farmer participation in rural public affairs management. Second, it deepens the level of research. By using a cross-level analysis method, combining the individual level of farmers and the village level, this study explains how micro-level individual behavior affects macro-level governance phenomena, while avoiding the ecological fallacy, and intuitively presenting how farmer participation can promote effective governance of the rural human settlement environment. Third, it provides innovation in empirical strategy. This study uses the DEA method to assess the performance of village-level human settlement management, unlike the old practice of solely using farmer satisfaction as a standard; and drawing on the ladder theory of public participation, it comprehensively measures farmer participation behavior in both breadth and depth, thereby providing new ideas for related research.

2 Literature review

Incorporating the role of farmer subjectivity in the evolving Chinese rural society has long been a focal issue (Qing et al., 2022). Scholars have delved into strategies for fostering this subjectivity, which can be roughly categorized into three aspects. The first is research related to “farmers should participate”. Rural habitat management is a systematic project that goes deep into the lives of farmers, which includes many difficulties and heavy tasks. The absence of meaningful farmer engagement can easily lead to the deviation of management work from the real needs of farmers (Thomas et al., 2020). Farmers have multiple identities as victims of environmental pollution, beneficiaries of environmental improvement, and active participants in environmental remediation (Li et al., 2020). Given their extended residence in villages and the profound local knowledge they possess, the participation of farmers is an important foundation and prerequisite for rural environmental governance (Liu and Tao, 2012; Wang et al., 2021). Therefore, the participation of farmers can help to improve the effectiveness of rural habitat management, and also help to overcome the dilemma of “weakening of farmer autonomy” (Wang et al., 2022).
The second aspect is studies on “why farmers are unwilling or unable to participate”. Policy systems: Government-dominated models restrict participatory space, which is compounded by inadequate institutional safeguards for the environmental rights of farmers (Gatersleben et al., 2002; Ostrom, 2007; Crilly et al., 2012). Imbalanced principal-agent structures further hinder participation (Ribot et al., 2006; Cao et al., 2020). Economic rationality: “Rational smallholders” prioritize self-interest leading to free-riding behaviors that impede spontaneous cooperation (Dik et al., 2023). Rural transformation: Rapid urbanization erodes local norms, reducing the farmers’ motivation for public engagement and environmental stewardship (Wang et al., 2016b; Stotten et al., 2021). Individual capacity: Low education levels, weak environmental awareness, and limited livelihood resources constrain the autonomy and innovative potential of farmers (Doan, 2016; Xu et al., 2024).
The third aspect of research on “how to realize effective participation” has largely focused on empirical case studies to unravel the underlying logic. Based on a study of the first 106 advanced counties of the National Village Cleaning Action, the logic of “embedded-inspired” social mobilization leading to cooperative action was outlined (Zhou et al., 2020). That case study found that farmer participation in environmental governance was driven by the dual logic of value and emotional identity. Realizing participatory governance requires the establishment of a farmer participation mechanism centered on identity (Osborn and Datta, 2006), and relies on the path of collective environmental governance by farmers that is embedded in external forces and internal social network reshaping (Dik et al., 2023). From the perspective of state-society relations, the case studies and theoretical derivations are similar, and they jointly center on the issue of reconciling the state-society relationship, and propose a practical logic of farmer participation that stimulates village autonomy by policy politicization (Wan et al., 2020) and self-governance by administrative stimulation. Note that farmer participation is only a means to an end, while improved governance efficiency is the ultimate goal.
In contrast, there is relatively little academic research on the efficiency of rural habitat management. Some studies have concentrated on governance performance, particularly on identifying the factors that affect it. For instance, Lu and Xu (2023) employed a method known as fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis, which has been applied to investigate the factors influencing the performance of rural human settlement governance in China's provincial regions. It also examines how these factors are interconnected and aims to uncover the mechanisms and choices that lead to high governance performance. The few studies that have evaluated the effectiveness of rural habitat governance were mostly based on micro-survey data, presenting the progress of rural habitat governance implementation with descriptive statistics (Wang et al., 2019) and satisfaction studies from the perspective of farm households (Xiao et al., 2022). The current assessment of rural living environment governance is mainly output-based, so it seldom considers the relationship between inputs and outputs. Scholars have noted an important issue under administrative pressure, i.e., over-intensification in rural environmental governance (Leng, 2022). Therefore, it is crucial to consider the government’s capacity and the actual needs of farmers in this governance (Peng et al., 2023).
Previous research has identified three critical gaps requiring systematic investigation. First, while the academic consensus recognizes the participatory engagement of farmers as a governance determinant, existing studies have inadequately analyzed the causal mechanisms between engagement and outcomes—which is a persistent “black box” requiring processual analysis. Second, governance performance evaluation suffers from fragmented frameworks due to ad hoc metric construction and overreliance on reductionist proxies like satisfaction surveys, while neglecting comprehensive benchmarking systems. Third, methodological limitations persist in participation measurement. For example, dichotomous approaches (presence/absence or frequency counts) conflate quality with occurrence while exhibiting scale insensitivity to behavioral substance, thus risking Type II errors in detecting governance impacts. These gaps collectively hinder theoretical advancement and evidence-based policymaking in rural governance studies.
The current research paradigm exhibits limitations in systematically capturing the nuanced differentiation of the farmers’ engagement levels in environmental governance, particularly within the temporal and contextual constraints of current empirical studies. To bridge this theoretical and methodological gap, this investigation established an analytical framework that elucidates the causal mechanisms through which farmer participation enhances governance efficacy in rural human settlements. Building upon public participation theory, this study advances a threefold methodological contribution: 1) Developing a multidimensional evaluation system for rural habitat governance efficiency through composite indicator analysis; 2) Operationalizing participatory dynamics through two key dimensions of participation breadth and participation depth; and 3) Employing advanced econometric modeling to quantify the marginal effects of participatory factors. Through rigorous empirical validation using longitudinal field data from representative Chinese villages, this analysis systematically examined the proposed mechanisms and generated evidence-based policy recommendations for optimizing participatory governance structures.

3 Theoretical analysis

3.1 Logic of farmer participation in promoting the effective governance of rural human settlements

The participation of farmers in promoting the effective governance of rural human settlements follows the logic of “empowerment-interaction between government and society-common governance and efficiency”. The realization of effective participation by rural households is the logical starting point for their enhancement of rural habitat governance efficiency. From the perspective of the State-society relations theory, the participation of farmers in governance is a process of “empowerment”. This empowerment represents a comprehensive institutional supply to ensure that farmers participate in the governance of the rights to resources and participation qualifications, while the core of empowerment is enhancing the feasibility of the governance subject, in order to change its role in the traditional governance of “passive participation” and the “subjectivity of the absence of the field” situation (Kusnandar, et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2023).
“Empowerment and Enhancement” systematically shapes the dynamic advantages of farmer subjects from the dimensions of participation qualification and subject identity, as well as participation ability and autonomous thinking. The acquisition of these dynamic advantages can spur farmers to shift from “political indifference” under the path of sectional mobilization to a “political and social interaction” mechanism of environmental concern, action consciousness and active response. The “government-society interaction” is a complex mechanism involving the allocation of powers and responsibilities, cultivation of the main body, information communication, supervision and constraints, and others.
In terms of the perspective of farmer participation, the cornerstone lies in the bidirectional flow of information. This encompasses not only the top-down dissemination of relevant government policies, information, and resources but also the bottom-up communication of the needs of farmers and the subsequent timely and proactive responses to their feedback. Under the mechanism of “government-society interaction”, the subjectivity of farmers has been reshaped through the establishment of organizational structures, operational modes and synergistic mechanisms. Rural human settlements have finally reached a governance pattern of “common governance and efficiency”.

3.2 Role and mechanisms of farmer participation in promoting the effective governance of rural human settlements

The analysis of the mechanism of farmer participation in promoting the effective governance of rural human settlements represents a profound exploration of the “government-society interaction” node within the broader context of promoting effective rural governance and a refined interpretation from the perspective of farmers. Farmer participation promotes effective governance of the village habitat mainly through the mechanisms of democratic supervision and response to demands. As a result, the logic and mechanism of the impact of farmer participation on the efficiency of rural habitat management are shown in Figure 1 and analyzed in subsequent sections.
Figure 1 Logic and mechanism of the effect of farmer participation on the efficiency of village habitat management
The mechanism of democratic supervision is the process by which farmers transform the governance structure relationship between themselves and the grassroots government, village-level organizations and other stakeholders. By exercising their right to supervise, farmers form an orientation or even a soft restriction on the allocation of governance resources to realize the role of effective governance. As the Party and the State have paid increasing attention to guaranteeing the fundamental rights of peasants and improving their understanding of politics, this has enhanced the awareness of the protection and exercise of the rights of peasant households. The logic of farmer participation in governance has shifted from “action for survival” to “action for rights” (Dai, 2021).
Democratic supervision is as an important element and key link in the autonomy of farming households, and an important growth point for grass-roots democracy. With “empowerment” as the underlying logic of farmer participation, the right to democratic supervision, which is closely related to their interests, will inevitably become the first “empowerment” right. Given the significant investments in rural human settlement governance and the absence of a charging system based on the principle of “polluter pays”, many rural collective economies have borne a disproportionate burden. As the direct stakeholders and observers of governance efficiency, farmers possess both the endogenous motivation and the authority to monitor village habitat governance. Therefore, as a long-term and cost-effective monitoring mechanism, the participation of rural households has become a strong endogenous force driving the effective governance of rural human settlements. The full exercise of democratic monitoring rights ensures that governance activities are conducted in a fair, transparent and effective manner.
The demand-response mechanism is the process by which farmers express and convey their governance needs by adjusting the interactions of interests between themselves and the responding subjects (village organizations and grass-roots governments). This enables their opinions to be adopted and their needs to be satisfied upon receiving effective responses, thereby guiding the optimization of the governance rules, methods, and processes toward restoring the essence of life in governance and achieving effective governance.
The CLEAR model of participatory governance, proposed by governance expert Stoker, analyzes the logic and action process behind public participation from five aspects: being able to do it, wanting to do it, enabling it, being invited to do it, and doing it as a response (Stoker, 1998). Within this framework, “doing it as a response” is a logical analysis from the perspective of the dynamic interaction between the main body of farmers and the responding bodies (village-level organizations and the government). It is a key element in determining the sustainability and consciousness of public participation. In the context of rural habitat management, “doing it as a response” means that the responding subjects (village organizations and the government) refrain from using mere “propaganda slogans” to perfunctorily meet the farmers’ needs for safeguarding their environmental rights and interests. Instead, they act upon the farmers’ opinions, aligning with the essence of the demands they describe. The response mechanism operates similarly across different subject positions. On the one hand, the effective participation of farmers can not only ensure the effective communication of the real governance needs of farmers but also prompt the main body of the response to change the previous practice of serving the administrative tasks and indicators. This results in practicing the principle of “people-centered” by listening to the “people’s needs” and meeting the “people’s expectations” to make governance decisions more in line with the actual needs and interests of farmers.
On the other hand, the effective response to the farmers’ governance needs can not only enhance their sense of self-efficiency but also effectively stimulate their enthusiasm and internal motivation to participate, propelling their involvement into the next “empowerment” cycle. Additionally, it facilitates the gradual improvement of mechanisms for information communication, emotional contact, interest coordination, supervision, and inspection during the dynamic adjustment of multi-stakeholder collaborative governance. As these mechanisms evolve, the governance of rural human settlements will become more standardized and institutionalized.
The theoretical analysis block diagram (Figure 2) outlines the influence of farmer participation on the efficiency of village human environment governance. Farmer participation will have a direct effect on the efficiency of village human environment governance (Path 1), and at the same time, their participation indirectly enhances efficiency through democratic supervision (Path 2) and demand response (Path 3). In addition, the variables reflecting village characteristics and farm household characteristics also affect the efficiency of village habitat governance.
Figure 2 Theoretical analysis framework

4 Data and modeling

4.1 Data

4.1.1 Data sources

The data used in this study were collected from a field questionnaire survey conducted by the team from June to December 2021 in Nanping and Longyan, Fujian Province. The survey targeted village organizations and farmers, with village samples randomly selected based on the level of economic development, population size, and geographic location. Within each sample village, 8-9 farm households were randomly chosen from the roster.
The survey was conducted by a team of graduate students with extensive research experience, who conducted one-on-one questionnaire interviews with farmers through field visits or by telephone (pre-arranged by village officials). The investigators filled out the questionnaires based on clear statements from the farmers. A total of 202 village samples and 1424 farm household samples were obtained. After processing missing values and outliers, and matching the village and farm household samples, the final dataset comprised 192 valid village samples and 1401 farmers samples, as summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 Distribution of the survey sample
City County (district) Sample townships (towns) Number of
villages		 Number of
farmers		 Percentage of villages (%)
Nanping Jianyang Masha, Shufang, Shuiji, Tancheng, Tongyou, Xushi, Zhangdun 47 330 24.48
Jian’ou Dikou, Fangdao, Xiaoqiao, Xiaosong, Xudun, Yushan 26 233 13.54
Shunchang Yuankeng, Zhengfang 14 120 7.29
Zhenghe Chengyuan, Dongping, Tieshan, Waitun, Xingxi, Xiongshan, Zhenqian 49 373 25.52
Longyan Changting Sanzhou, Tieshan, Tongfang, Tufang, Xinqiao, Zhuotian 30 177 15.63
Xinluo Dongxiao, Hongfang, Jiangshan, Longmen 26 168 13.54

4.1.2 Variable selection and assignment

(1) Explained variables. Taking the efficiency value of rural habitat management as the explanatory variable, the input and output indicators are shown in Table 2. Among them, the input indicators include basic elements such as capital, land and labor. In addition to the direct ecological goal, the output indicators account for the goals of rural civilization development, and the environmental awareness and behavioral changes of farmers (Table 3). Based on the above input-output variables, the governance efficiency was measured with the help of the DEA-BCC model. According to the results (Table 4), the average value of governance efficiency across the sample villages was 0.474, with a variance of 0.305, indicating an overall moderate efficiency level but with notable variation between villages.
Table 2 Input-output indicators for measuring the efficiency of rural habitat management
Type Target Meaning and indicator components
Inputs Financial inputs Funds for the purchase of equipment for governance facilities (million yuan yr-1)
Management and maintenance funds (million yuan yr-1)
Land inputs Area of land for construction of treatment facilities (ha)
Labor inputs Number of environmental personnel (persons)
Outputs Ecological outputs Coverage of household latrines (%)
Domestic sewage collection and treatment rate (%)
Domestic waste disposal rate (%)
Social outputs Increased environmental awareness among farmers
Farmers’ environmental habits improve
Table 3 Basis and meaning of the division of farmer participation behaviors
Behavioral level Behavioral interpretation Farmer participation behavior
Manipulated lead Passive acceptance of policies and programs already formulated by the government or relevant agencies Non-participation
Pass Access to governance information such as policies, plans, targets, etc., through bulletin boards,
pamphlets, microblogging groups, and others, but not yet substantive engagement		 Receive information
Inquiry reassure Expressing their opinions and demands, participating in discussions, and making suggestions through the Farmers’ Congress, the Farmers’ Representative Assembly, and others, but with no autonomy over whether the suggestions are adopted Device
Collaborative authorizations Substantive cooperation with government or relevant institutions in the development and implementation of governance policies and plans, with decision-making authority that directly affects the governance processes and outcomes Participation in
decision-making
Citizen control Greater decision-making power and control through self-organization, self-management and self-supervision Organization and management
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the variables
Variable Variable meaning and assignment Average value Standard errors Minimum value Maximum value
Efficiency of village habitat management DEA model measurements 0.474 0.305 0.067 1
Farmer participation Arithmetic mean of participatory behaviors in the five habitat governance components
No participation at all = 1, Receive information = 2, Provide advice = 3, Participate in decision-making = 4, Organize and manage = 5		 2.934 0.909 1 4.875
Farmer demand response Hardly ever = 1, Occasionally = 2, Usually = 3, More often = 4, Very often = 5 2.734 1.143 1 5
Supervision of village information Hardly ever = 1, Occasionally = 2, Usually = 3, More often = 4, Very often = 5 3.245 1.100 1 5
Village population size Registered population in the village 1935.766 1491.507 186 14381
Geographic location of villages Physical distance of the village council from the county town①(km) 23.941 19.046 1 80
Environmental pollution in the village Environmental pollution in the village before treatment
Rarely = 1, Less often = 2, Fairly often = 3, More severe = 4, Very severe = 5		 3.578 0.821 1 5
Proportion of out-of-home workers Percentage of laborers who have been working outside the county for more than half a year: Below 30% = 1, around 40% = 2, around 50% = 3, around 60% = 4, above 70% = 5 2.536 1.092 1 5
Village collective income Average annual income of village collectives in the last five years (ten thousand yuan) 18.957 29.164 0 200

①The shortest road distance between the two locations was calculated using AutoNavi Map software.

(2) Explanatory variables. In practice, farmer participation consists of two aspects: breadth and depth. Breadth refers to the number of governance issues in which farmers actively participate, while depth measures their level of involvement in these issues. The depth of farmer participation is further examined by drawing on Arnstein’s ladder theory of public participation, which divides the types of public participation into eight levels (see Table 3) (Arnstein, 2019).
In adapting this framework to China’s rural society, a direct mapping may not fully align, but we attempted to classify farmer participation levels based on the ladder theory’s core concept. The governance of rural human settlements covers a wide range of contents, and according to the central policy document, it includes five main projects: rural toilet revolution, village cleanup, household garbage management, household sewage treatment and village appearance improvement. Combined with the actual rural governance and the position of farmers, the depth of participation was divided into five levels: “no participation”, “receiving information”, “providing suggestions”, “participating in decision-making”, and “organizing management”. These levels were assigned values from 1 to 5 in ascending order, and the basis for the division of participation behavior and the specific interpretations are shown in Table 3. The participation behavior of farmers was characterized by their average level of participation in the five governance projects mentioned above. Since this study is based on a village perspective, the individual farmer data needed to be matched with the corresponding sample village data by calculating the arithmetic mean.
(3) Mediating variables. According to the above theoretical analysis, to empirically examine the mechanism of democratic supervision and demand response, the frequencies of “village affairs information supervision” and “farmers’ demand response” in the context of governance of the rural human settlement environment signify the exercise of democratic supervision rights and demand response, respectively. Measuring the frequencies of both from the individual farmer’s perspective, we assigned values from 1 to 5, where higher numbers indicate greater frequency, by taking the arithmetic means of these values across the village.
(4) Control variables. Based on the need for model construction, and with reference to existing related research (Wang et al., 2016b; Li et al., 2021), village population size, geographic location, environmental pollution, labor force outflow and village collective income were selected as the control variables. Environmental pollution refers to the pollution situation of the village before 2018, and labor force outflow takes the mid-year of the year before the study and out-of-county labor as the time node and the delineation standard, respectively.
Descriptive statistics of all the above variables are shown in Table 4.

4.2 Modeling

4.2.1 DEA model

Compared to the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) model, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) does not require consideration of the functional relationship between inputs and outputs, prior estimation of parameters, or any weight assumptions, thereby avoiding subjective factors and making it suitable for measuring efficiency values under multiple inputs and outputs. Therefore, this study used DEA to measure the efficiency of rural human settlement environment governance. The model can be described as follows:
$\text { s.t. }\left\{\begin{array}{c} \min \left[\theta-\varphi\left(s^{-}+s^{+}\right)\right] \\ \sum_{j=1}^{n} \gamma_{j} X_{j}+s^{-}=\theta X_{0} \\ \sum_{j=1}^{n} \gamma_{j} Y_{j}+s^{+}=\theta Y_{0} \\ \sum_{j=1}^{n} \gamma_{j}=1 \\ s^{+} \geq 0, \quad s^{-} \geq 0, \quad \gamma_{j} \geq 0, \quad j=1,2,3, \cdots, n \end{array}\right.$
In the model, θ represents the efficiency value of the decision-making unit, with 0≤θ≤1. X0 is the target input, and Y0 is the target output. Xj is the input of the j-th decision-making unit, and Yj is the output of the j-th decision-making unit. γj is the weight of the j-th decision-making unit, while s− and s+ are the slacks.
The meaning of this model is that all inputs are reduced in the same proportion as much as possible without reducing the output, while s− and s+ give the information of the input-output structural adjustments of the evaluated production unit. In the above formula, if θ0=1, s−=1, s+=1, then the j0-th DMU is DEA effective; if θ0=1, s−≠0, s+ ≠0, then the j0-th DMU is DEA weakly effective; if θ0 <1, then the production unit is non-technically effective; and if s−≠0, s+≠0 exists, then there is also an unreasonable input and output structure, and the “projection” on its effective frontier can be calculated in this case (Liu et al., 2023)

4.2.2 Tobit regression model

Since the governance efficiency measured by the DEA method is a discrete and truncated value, applying the least squares method for regression analysis would lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimation. To address this issue, the Tobit model can be used to deal with a regression model with restricted dependent variables. Consequently, the Tobit regression model was chosen to test the research hypotheses in this study, and the Tobit regression equation was constructed as follows:
G E i = α 0 + α 1 P B i + α i Z i + ε i
where GEi is the rural habitat management efficiency of the i-th sample village; PBi is the explanatory variable of farmer participation; α0 is constant terms; α1 is the regression coefficient of farmer participation; αi is the regression coefficient of the control variables; Zi is the set of control variables; and εi is the random error term.
To further test the mechanism of the roles of democratic monitoring and demand response, a three-step approach was used to test the mediating effects of these two factors in the impact of farmer participation on the efficiency of rural habitat management.
D S i = ρ 0 + ρ 1 P B i + ρ 3 Z i + λ i
G E i = ρ ′ 0 + ρ ′ 1 P B i + ρ ′ 2 D S i + ρ ′ 3 Z i + ε ′ i
D R i = δ 0 + δ 1 P B i + δ 3 Z i + λ i
G E i = δ ′ 0 + δ ′ 1 P B i + δ ′ 2 D R i + δ ′ 3 Z i + ε ′ i
Equations (3) and (4) test the mediating role of democratic supervision. In Equation (3), DSi represents the mediating variable of village affairs information supervision for the i-th sample village, where ρ0 is the constant term; ρ1 denotes the regression coefficient for farmer participation; ρ3 denotes the regression coefficient of the control variables; Zi indicates the set of control variables; and λi represents the random error term. In Equation (4), GEi stands for the governance efficiency of rural human settlements in the i-th sample village, PBi serves as the explanatory variable (farmer participation), and DSi functions as the mediating variable (village affairs information supervision). Here, ρ0’ represents the constant term; ρ1’ indicates the regression coefficient for farmer participation; ρ2’ denotes the regression coefficient for village affairs information supervision; ρ3’ denotes the regression coefficient of the control variables; Zi maintains the set of control variables, and ε ′ i constitutes the random error term.
Equations (5) and (6) test the mediation effect of demand response. In Equation (5), DRi represents the mediating variable of demand response for the i-th sample village, where δ0 is the constant term; δ1 denotes the regression coefficient for farmer participation; δ3 denotes the regression coefficient of the control variables; Zi indicates the set of control variables, and λi represents the random error term. In Equation (6), GEi stands for the governance efficiency of rural human settlements in the i-th sample village, PBi serves as the explanatory variable (farmer participation), and DRi functions as the mediating variable (demand response). Here, δ ′ 0represents the constant term; δ ′ 1 indicates the regression coefficient for farmer participation; δ ′ 2 denotes the regression coefficient for village affairs information supervision; δ ′ 3 denotes the regression coefficient of the control variables; Z i maintains the set of control variables, and ε ′ i constitutes the random error term.

5 Results and analysis

5.1 Analysis of baseline regression results

The results of the Tobit regression model for the impact of farmer participation on the efficiency of village habitat management are shown in Table 5 and Table 6. Models (1) and (3) only examine farmer participation, while models (2) and (4) incorporate additional control variables to assess the impact of farmer participation. A comparison of the regression results across these models shows that the choice of control variables has no significant effect on the regression results of the core variables, and that the estimates are robust. The regression results indicate that the participation of farmers has a statistically significant positive effect on governance efficiency at the 1% level. This suggests that the breadth and depth of farmer participation in the governance of village human settlements can effectively promote the improvement of governance efficiency.
Table 5 Estimated results of the impact of farmer participation on the efficiency of village habitat management
Variable Model (1) Model (2)
Farmer participation 0.091*** 0.061***
(0.023) (0.023)
Population size of farm households② - 0.079**
(0.033)
Geographic location of villages - 0.003***
(0.001)
Environmental pollution in villages - -0.061**
(0.026)
Proportion of out-of-home workers - -0.059***
(0.018)
Village collective income - -0.001
(0.001)
Constant term 0.207*** 0.034
(0.072) (0.293)
LRchi2 14.71 45.59
PseudoR2 0.1664 0.5160
Observations 192 192

Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; “-” indicates that the variable was not included in the regression model. The same below.

② Since the values of regression coefficients were too small to facilitate the presentation of the results when the original value of the number of farm household population was used in the model, the logarithmic form was used for the post-processing.

On the one hand, extensive farmer participation in governance projects not only allows them to gain a comprehensive insight into the real-time dynamics and intricacies of village human settlement governance but also serves as a key basis for farmers to fully embody their pivotal role as the main actors in the governance process. Through extensive participation, farmers gradually change from being “bystanders” to active participants and develop a stronger sense of belonging and responsibility for the results of the governance, which in turn promotes the efficient implementation of the governance work.
On the other hand, the in-depth participation of farmers in governance projects helps them to articulate their genuine needs and aspirations, prompts the grass-roots government and village-level organizations to pay more attention to and incorporate the views of farmers, and changes the structure of the main body of village human settlement governance. These factors have an impact on governance decisions and even reshape the pattern of benefit distribution. Through the deep participation process, a bidirectional, constructive, and efficient mode of government-society interaction emerges, which prompts the grass-roots government to prioritize the adaptable execution of policies and ensures that they are more grounded in village realities. This approach both ensures efficient governance and enhances the satisfaction and sense of acceptance among farming households.

5.2 Mechanism of action test

The tests of the mediating effects of democratic supervision and demand response were carried out in three steps. In the first step, the efficiency of village human settlement governance serveed as the dependent variable, while farmer participation and other control variables were introduced into the model. This step examined the direct impact of farmer participation on the efficiency of village human settlement governance, with the outcomes shown in Model (2) in Table 5. In the second step, taking the supervision of village affairs information and farmer demand response as the dependent variables, the effects of farmer participation and the control variables on them were investigated, and the results are shown in Models (3) and (4) of Table 6. In the third step, village information supervision and the farmers’ demand response were put into the model along with farmer participation to examine the mediation effect, and the results correspond to Models (5) and (6) in Table 6, respectively.
Table 6 Results of the mediation effect test for democratic supervision
Variable Model (3)
Supervision of village information		 Model (4)
Governance efficiency		 Model (5)
Farmer demand response		 Model (6)
Governance efficiency
Farmer participation 0.176** 0.0494** 0.246*** 0.0540**
(0.089) (0.022) (0.092) (0.023)
Supervision of village information - 0.0676*** - -
(0.018)
Farmer demand response - - - 0.0296*
(0.018)
Control variables Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Constant term 1.102 -0.0512 2.921** -0.0774
(1.103) (0.281) (1.252) (0.293)
LRchi2 11.24 59.74 14.78 48.38
PseudoR2 0.0194 0.6761 0.0248 0.5476
Observations 192 192 192 192

Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 2. The same below.

As shown in Table 6, there are partial positive mediating effects of village information supervision and the farmers’ demand response in the context of farmer participation influencing the efficiency of village habitat management. Specifically, these mediating effects account for 19.50%③ (③ The calculation formula was 0.176×0.0676÷0.061=0.195. The remaining mediating effects were calculated in the same way.)and 11.94% of the total effects, respectively. This indicates that the direct effect of farmer participation on the governance efficiency of village human settlements is dominant, but the indirect effects on the governance efficiency are also formed through village information supervision and the farmers’ demand response. Moreover, the mediating effect of village information supervision is relatively greater in magnitude than the farmers’ demand response.
This can be explained by the fact that village affairs information supervision, a more traditional means of democratic monitoring in villages, is a more controllable and low-cost participation choice for farmers. Consequently, when farmers choose to participate, they tend to prioritize village information supervision over other forms of participation, such as expressing needs, participating in decision making, or contributing resources. Therefore, farmer participation can have an impact on the efficiency of village habitat governance through village information supervision.
On the other hand, in the practice of rural governance, the response to the needs of farmers not only requires a smooth channel for the expression of demands but it also requires the grass-roots government and village-level organizations to pay attention to the demands and effectively respond to them in reconciling the interests of multiple subjects. The reshaping of the subjective position of farmers is becoming the main theme of governance practice, and the needs of farmers are gradually receiving responses through formal or informal institutional arrangements. This is manifested as a mediating influence on the influence path of farmer participation in the efficiency of village human settlement governance.
However, the previous governance model focused on accomplishing administrative tasks still has great “inertia” in village governance and the farmers’ perceptions, so the government-society interaction model that effectively responds to the needs of farmers still needs to be explored on a long-term basis. According to the statistical description of the variables in the previous section, the average level of participation of all farmers is only 2.934 (which is close to, but not yet reaching, the level of “providing recommendations”), indicating that it is necessary to further expand the depth of their participation and strengthen the effect of its influence on governance efficiency.

5.3 Robustness and endogeneity tests

5.3.1 Robustness tests

Two approaches were selected for the robustness test by substituting the independent and dependent variables. First, the level of farmer participation was substituted with the level of farmer collective participation, as evaluated by the village committee, which served as the independent variable. Second, the governance efficiency was replaced with the subjective perception of the farmers’ satisfaction with the village habitat governance, which acted as the dependent variable. The results obtained from these regressions are shown in Table 7. They are basically consistent with the results of the benchmark model, indicating that the research results have good robustness.
Table 7 Robustness and endogeneity test results
Variable Replacement of
independent variables		 Replacement of
the dependent variable		 First stage Second stage
Governance efficiency Satisfaction Farmer participation Governance efficiency
Collective participation 0.469*** - -
(0.121)
Farmer participation - 0.358*** - 0.327***
(0.030) (0.109)
Instrumental variable: Whether a system of incentives and disincentives is in place 0.232*** -
(0.054)
Constant term -0.162 2.672*** 2.674*** -0.756
(0.296) (0.384) (0.874) (0.526)
LRchi2 52.94 117.17 36.09 -
PseudoR2 0.5992 0.4444 0.0711 -
Observations 192 192 192 192

5.3.2 Endogeneity test

Farmer participation improves the efficiency of village human settlement governance through democratic supervision and demand response. Conversely, better governance in village human settlements can foster a more inclusive environment that encourages farmers to participate more vigorously in decision-making processes. This bidirectional relationship gives rise to a potential endogeneity issue of mutual causality between farmer participation and the efficiency of village habitat governance. To ensure the robustness of the findings, the instrumental variable method was used to test the results. “Whether or not a system of rewards and penalties is in place” was selected as the instrumental variable for “farmer participation”. At the time of the survey, several villages had implemented village rules and regulations such as points exchange and red and blacklists to provide material and spiritual incentives or constraints for farmers to participate in public affairs governance. Numerous case studies have highlighted the significant impact of these measures on farmer participation in decision-making. Moreover, the introduction of such a reward and punishment system does not directly influence the efficiency of village habitat management, thereby satisfying the correlation and exogenous requirements of an instrumental variable.
To accurately capture the implementation of the reward and punishment incentive system, numerical values from 1 to 5 representing from small to large, respectively, were used to characterize the level of implementation of the sys- tem. The IV Tobit model was used for testing, and Table 7 reports the model estimation results of “whether to implement a reward and punishment system” as an instrumental variable for “farmer participation”. The original hypothesis was rejected at the 1% significance level. The Wald value of the weak instrumental variable test was 9.23, indicating the validity of the instrumental variable. The robustness of the baseline regression results was further validated by using the instrumental variables approach to address endogeneity, and the results were consistent with the basic conclusions reached previously.

6 Discussion

Much of the existing literature supports the assertion that farmer participation contributes to the governance of human settlements. However, the question of how farmer participation enhances the effectiveness of governance remains a “black box”. This study analyzed the logic and mechanism of the influence of farmer participation on the efficiency of village habitat governance by comprehensively applying empowerment theory and the public participation ladder theory. The transmission paths were examined by applying the DEA-BCC model, the Tobit model, and a three-step mediation test method.
The efficiency of rural habitat management was measured scientifically, accounting for the input and output levels of various aspects. At the same time, based on the ladder theory of public participation, the participation behavior of farmers was measured comprehensively from the dual dimensions of breadth and depth of participation, using a scale with substantive behavioral meaning. This scientific and innovative approach to the core variables is a useful exploration and attempt to overcome the shortcomings of previous studies, and provides actionable ideas for deepening the research issues of farmer participation and rural habitat governance. In addition, the scientific revelation of the logic and mechanism of the influence of farmer participation in enhancing the effectiveness of village human settlement governance effectively expands the boundaries of the research landscape. This study provides robust evidence to support the viewpoints on the importance and necessity of farmer participation that are consistently strongly emphasized by the academic community at present, while also elucidating the intrinsic mechanism of the consensual logic chain of farmer participation in enhancing the effectiveness of governance. The findings of this study can provide strategic guidelines for precisely strengthening villager participation in order to realize regular and efficient governance of the village habitat environment and also contribute to the systematic framework of farmer participation in environmental governance.
However, this study has certain limitations. First, there are geographic limitations in the sample selection. The survey was confined to northern Fujian Province as the study area, which constrains the theoretical generalizability. Future research will expand the study regions to enhance the applicability of the theoretical framework. Second, insufficient consideration was given to moderating factors. This study did not thoroughly explore the potential impacts of moderating variables such as cultural traditions, clan influence, or digital governance tools on participation mechanisms. In addition, more mediating pathways need to be explored, such as the roles of social trust and collective action efficacy.

7 Conclusions

Based on survey data from 1401 farming households and 192 villages in northwestern Fujian Province, this study employed the DEA method to measure the efficiency of rural human settlement environment governance at the village level. Using a Tobit model, it explored the impact pathways of farmer participation on the efficiency of human settlement governance. This study produced two main conclusions. First, the impact of farmer participation on the efficiency of village human settlement governance follows the logic of “empowerment and empowerment -- government and society interaction -- common governance and efficiency”. Farmer participation can become an endogenous driving force for improving the efficiency of village human settlement governance by enhancing their ability to exercise democratic rights and adjusting the governance structure and interest relations. Second, the participation of farmers transforms the mode of interaction between the government and society through “democratic supervision” and “demand response” and drives the realization of effective governance in village human settlement environmental governance. In summary, the participation of rural households not only directly improves efficiency but also indirectly enhances it through democratic supervision and demand response.
The above findings have important implications for the exploration of a regular and efficient mechanism for the governance of rural human settlements at the present stage. With a strong state, it is difficult for village-level organizations to accomplish all their governance goals simply by relying on endogenous resources or finding “self-governance”. The presence of the state in the governance of human settlements and the administrative influence on village-level organizations is a reality that must be faced. Consequently, giving full play to the participation of farmers in order to realize the normal and efficient governance of village human settlements is ultimately based on a scientific treatment of the relationship between administration and self-governance. To this end, grass-roots governments should actively create village self-governance mechanisms and support structures, shape the concept of intellectual democracy and communication mechanisms, strengthen the protection of farmers’ rights to information, supervision and decision-making, reduce the cost and threshold of participation by farmers, and enhance the sense of participation effectiveness. In addition, grass-roots governments should not only pay attention to the transformation of their policies on human settlement governance but also give village-level organizations enough space for policy adjustments. This will ensure that they maintain a certain degree of autonomy and flexibility in the process of policy implementation and respect and accept the legitimate demands and references of the farming households.

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