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Journal of Resources and Ecology >

2024 , Vol. 15 >Issue 2: 258 - 266

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2024.02.002

Agroecology and Agricultural Development

Case Study on Indigenous Rice Germplasm Conservation in Yuanjiang, China, based on Stakeholder Theory

  • WEN Yi , 1 ,
  • LIU Ying 1 ,
  • XU Jiwei 1 ,
  • SUN Rong 1 ,
  • WANG Huabin 1 ,
  • LIU Qingsong 1 ,
  • WANG Hai 2 ,
  • XU Rui , 1, * ,
  • LU Yi , 1, *
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  • 1. Yunnan Normal University, Kunming 650500, China
  • 2. Planning and Construction and Environmental Protection Center of Hualian Town, Ershan Yi Autonomous County, Yuxi, Yunnan 653200, China
*XU Rui, E-mail: ;
LU Yi, E-mail:

WEN Yi, E-mail:

Received date: 2022-09-20

  Accepted date: 2023-03-20

  Online published: 2024-03-14

Supported by

The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of The People’s Republic of China, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations(FAO)

Global Environment Facility(GEF)

Jointly Funded Project(GRFA-2021-11)

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Abstract

Indigenous rice, which can grow at higher altitudes, contains unique genes and genetic characteristics, but its future survival is uncertain. The conservation of indigenous rice is of great significance from the perspectives of both germplasm resource conservation and economic value. This paper puts forward suggestions for indigenous rice conservation in Yuanjiang County based on the stakeholder theory and the results of the three-party evolutionary game model involving the local government, enterprises or cooperatives, and farmers. This paper also provides references for the conservation and sustainable utilization of agricultural biodiversity and genetic resources in other crops. The results of the three-party evolutionary game model showed that in the short term, the protection of indigenous rice is in urgent need of encouragement and guidance from governments. This study found a close relationship between subsidies from the government and enthusiasm for buying and planting indigenous rice among enterprises as well as farmers. When the coefficient of governmental subsidy was low, enterprises tended to “not purchase”. On the contrary, when the coefficient of governmental subsidy was higher, the enterprises reached an evolutionary stable state faster, but the government reached the evolutionary stable state more slowly. When the coefficient of governmental subsidy to farmers was large, farmers tended to “do not plant” and the government tended to “do not encourage”. Therefore, the government should carefully weigh the subsidies, and take into account the local financial situation and the status quo of the restoration of indigenous rice planting as well as in-situ protection.

Key words： indigenous rice; variety protection; stakeholder theory; sustainable agriculture; rural revitalization

Cite this article

WEN Yi , LIU Ying , XU Jiwei , SUN Rong , WANG Huabin , LIU Qingsong , WANG Hai , XU Rui , LU Yi . Case Study on Indigenous Rice Germplasm Conservation in Yuanjiang, China, based on Stakeholder Theory[J]. Journal of Resources and Ecology, 2024 , 15(2) : 258 -266 . DOI: 10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2024.02.002

1 Introduction

Rice is one of the origin crops of China which is of global importance. China is rich in rice resources (Chai et al., 2022). Three wild rice varieties have been confirmed in China, namely common wild rice, medicinal wild rice, and wart-grain wild rice. Most wild rice cultivars are closely related to common cultivated rice (Ishikawa et al., 2020; Xu and Sun, 2021), but the wild rice contains various useful genes, such as those for disease, insect, weed and stress resistance, as well as high-efficiency nutrition high-yield and high-quality (Xu et al., 2020), which are important genetic resources for rice breeding (Zhang et al., 2021) and improvement (Chai et al., 2022). Yunnan Province is one of the genetic diversity centers of wild rice in China. There used to be 25 in-situ populations of common wild rice, but currently, only the Hongmang population in Jinghong and Yuanjiang are preserved in their natural state. The special status of Yunnan wild rice is of great concern (Zhong et al., 2020). The Yunnan common wild rice has various genetic differences and diversity (Li et al., 2020), and excellent genetic characteristics such as resistance to bacterial blight, rice blast, drought tolerance, cold tolerance, and high light efficiency (Zhang et al., 2022). It may also have a higher nutritional value for the amino acids, and the inorganic element contents of Yunnan wild rice are higher than those of common cultivated rice by around 30% to 50% (Zeng et al., 2021). Researchers generally believe that in-situ conservation is one of the best ways to protect wild rice (Rahman et al., 2021). In addition to the establishment of physically isolated protected areas, the construction of mainstream protected areas, including livelihood replacement and financial incentive mechanisms, have also received increasing attention (Huang et al., 2020; Yu et al., 2021).
Due to the continuous domestication and cultivation of wild rice by our agricultural ancestors, some indigenous rice varieties that are currently reserved in Yuanjiang County developed gradually, including Grasshopper Millet, Taiwei Millet, and Haxi Black Sticky Rice. The indigenous rice was grown in the rice fields of Yuanjiang at an altitude of 700 meters, and it grew in a unique climate and ecological environment (Xing et al., 2021). In recent years, the local government has committed to solving the contradictions between villagers and resources. The government has improved the protection of indigenous rice through activities such as the demonstration and promotion of incentive mechanisms, through improvements in policies and systems, publicity and capacity building, as well as increasing awareness and the added value of traditional varieties in the market, all in order to achieve the goals of improving farmers' livelihoods, ensuring food security, and improving the ability to cope with climate change and adapt to environmental changes.
However, at present, in the process of restoring terraced fields and indigenous rice planting, farmers have become highly dependent on governmental subsidies. Under the background of constraints in government financial resources, the governmental subsidy model cannot maintain long-term support, and it is now urgent to find ways to sustainably continue this path. The term “stakeholder” was first proposed by Freeman, and the research process consists of four steps. First, identify the group of stakeholders who are dealing with a problem. Second, identify the interests and relevance of each group. Third, determine how effectively the needs and expectations of each group can be met currently, and fourth, revise the policies and priorities to account for the different stakeholder interests. At present, in the field of agriculture, some scholars have used stakeholder theory to study how to build a community based on a shared future for new agricultural organizations, and some scholars have conducted research and analyses on the protection of agricultural biodiversity, climate-smart agriculture, agricultural cleaner production and other aspects based on this theory (Feng and Jiang, 2018; Feng et al., 2019; Moore et al., 2022). The planting and protection of indigenous rice involves multiple interests, so it is necessary to explore and form a participatory management mechanism for suitable development that is based on satisfying the interests of multiple parties.
To that end, this study introduces stakeholder theory to identify the stakeholders of indigenous rice planting and protection, and constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model including local governments, enterprises or cooperatives, and farmers. This study also conducted an evolutionary game analysis on the cultivation and protection of indigenous rice, and explored the strategy selection of the three-party game subjects and the factors affecting the stability of the system. The results provide reference for the conservation and sustainable use of agricultural biodiversity and genetic resources for food and agriculture.

2 Analysis of stakeholder relationships in Yuanjiang indigenous rice protection

According to previous research, the typical stakeholders in the process of indigenous rice protection include ordinary farmers, various business entities, relevant local government departments, and related enterprises. This study divided them into three categories. One category includes farmers which are mainly responsible for the tasks related to planting indigenous rice, and this category includes farmers and large professional households. The second is enterprises and cooperatives, including leading enterprises, agricultural cooperatives, professional large households, etc., which are mainly responsible for purchasing, processing, sales and other tasks. The third is the government, which is mainly responsible for guiding and encouraging the cultivation and protection of local varieties. In this study, farmers, enterprises, cooperatives, and the government were regarded as the participants and promoters of the protection of indigenous rice in Yuanjiang Country. For the protection of indigenous rice in Yuanjiang, a table of stakeholder participation motivations and methods was constructed, as shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 The motivation-behavior diagram of stakeholders
As the main promoter of indigenous rice protection and restoration, the government has played a leading role. The government promulgated relevant protection regulations and issued a certain number of subsidies to drive enterprises, cooperatives, farmers and other subjects to participate in the protection of indigenous rice and agricultural crop species diversity. Under the guidance of the central government, local governments can formulate relevant implementation plans according to local conditions to encourage, guide and supervise the behavior of various subjects in the protection of indigenous rice. On the one hand, the government can adopt regulations and policies to encourage companies to purchase indigenous rice at a higher price than ordinary rice and hybrid rice, so as to promote the willingness of local farmers to plant the indigenous rice. The government can also provide convenience in the supply of seeds, fertilizers and agricultural machinery in order to narrow the income gap between farmers who grow indigenous rice and those who grow hybrid rice. The government can provide preferential policies and assistance to enterprises and cooperatives when they sell indigenous rice products, so as to strengthen the awareness of the importance of Yuanjiang indigenous rice. In this way, farmers and enterprises can participate in a long-term, spontaneous and sustainable manner.
Enterprises include state-owned enterprises, private enterprises, agricultural cooperatives, and others. Enterprises purchase the indigenous rice grown by retail and professional large-scale households, process it and sell it all over the country and even abroad. Enterprises are the buyers and sellers in the Yuanjiang indigenous rice supply chain, as well as one of the main executors of the governmental policy of protecting indigenous rice. On the one hand, the enterprises are an important part of the primary rice supply chain and participate in the operation of the market economy. The price of its purchase affects the farmers’ willingness to plant, and the sale price also affects the operating conditions of the company. The enterprise’s scientific research and innovation ability, deep processing ability, product packaging ability, and market exploration ability all affect the implementation of indigenous rice protection. On the other hand, by participating in the protection of indigenous rice and the protection of agricultural crop diversity, enterprises fulfill their social responsibilities, expand their influence, and guide consumers to understand the nutritional and ecological advantages of indigenous rice in the promotion and marketing of indigenous rice products, which can help the enterprises to attract consumers and occupy market share, guide consumers to consume indigenous rice products, cultivate a group of sustainable consumer groups, obtain more economic benefits, and realize the “Win-Win Game” between the consumers and the enterprises. Although citizens have a certain general understanding of organic food, their understanding of local varieties of crops, especially indigenous rice, is not comprehensive enough. The number of consumers is small, and the economic benefits generated by enterprises in the short term are reduced to a certain extent.
Farmers are the main body of crop planting and the direct executor of indigenous rice protection, so the protection effect is closely related to farmers’ planting willingness and planting effect. Farmers’ planting willingness is affected by many factors, such as their age, family structure, property income level, ethnic habits, policy guidance, availability of indigenous rice seeds, the amounts of pesticides and fertilizers, and the degree of use of agricultural machinery. There are many Hani nationality farmers in Yuanjiang County. The Hani nationality farmers have the traditional custom of eating Grasshopper millet, Purple Sticky Rice, and other crops which have a long history of cultivation. The food made from indigenous rice tends to give them a stronger sense of satiety, thus, for the Hani nationality farmers who make a living by farming, they like to eat food made from indigenous rice. Local villagers have a habit of spontaneously planting indigenous rice in small areas for family consumption, and it is also feasible to restore indigenous rice planting without losing economic benefits in order to inherit and protect their own national culture.
In summary, as three stakeholders with close relationships and mutual influences, the government, enterprises, and farmers are driven by the “motivation-behavior” diagram as shown in Fig. 1.

3 Evolutionary game of the protection of indigenous rice in Yuanjiang from the perspective of stakeholders

3.1 Model and hypothesis development

Hypothesis 1: The main players in the game are the government, enterprises (including agricultural cooperatives, processing companies, logistics and transportation companies, and sales companies), and farmers (including retail farmers in planting, part-time farmers, and large agricultural households), and these three players in the game are bound, rational people.
Hypothesis 2: Government departments can encourage farmers to resume planting indigenous rice by introducing relevant compulsory policies and economic subsidy policies; enterprises can purchase indigenous rice at a base price not lower than hybrid rice and ordinary rice to promote the farmers’ willingness to plant and promote government protection of local areas. For the variety of crops farmers will plant indigenous rice to increase the economic income of their agricultural planting while inheriting and protecting the cultural traditions of the Hani nationality farmers.
Hypothesis 3: The governmental strategy set in this study was [incentive, no incentive], the enterprise’s strategy set was [acquisition, no acquisition], and the farmer’s strategy set was [planting, no planting]. The proportions of the government, enterprises and farmers who choose incentives, purchases, and planting were represented by x, y, and z, respectively, and the proportions that choose no incentives, no purchases, and no planting were set as 1-x, 1-y, and 1-z, respectively.

3.2 Model construction and parameter setting

The relevant parameters of the game subjects were set as follows (see Table 1).
Table 1 The game matrix of the tripartite interest subjects
No. Combination mode Government Businesses and cooperatives Farmers
1 [incentive, acquisition, planting] G1+G2-C1-αC2-βC3 F-C4+αC2 P1+P2-C5+βC3
2 [incentive, acquisition, no planting] G1-D2-C1-αC2 -C4+αC2 0
3 [incentive, no acquisition, planting] G1-D1+G2-C1-βC3 -D3 P1+P2-C5+βC3
4 [incentive, no acquisition, no planting] G1−D1−D2−C1 -D3 0
5 [no incentive, acquisition, planting] G2-C1 F-C4 P1+P2-C5
6 [no incentive, acquisition, no planting] -C1 -C4 0
7 [no incentive, no acquisition, planting] G2-C1 -D3 P1+P2-C5
8 [no incentive, no acquisition, no planting] -C1 -D3 0
G1 indicates that when the local government promotes the restoration of indigenous rice planting and in-situ protection, it is affirmed by the higher-level government departments and the governmental credibility is improved, in other words, the governmental intangible performance and credibility benefits. When enterprises and cooperatives do not participate, the government income decreases by D1, and when farmers do not cooperate with participating in planting and protection, the government income decreases by D2. G2 represents the economic and social benefits obtained by local governments when restoring indigenous rice planting and protecting agricultural crop diversity and ecological diversity, such as the optimization of the rural environment in Yuanjiang County, the enhancement of Yuanjiang County’s popularity, green food, organic agricultural products, or geographical indications of agricultural products and other certifications to increase the added value of products and thus bring economic benefits, etc. C1 represents the policy cost for the government to promote the protection of indigenous rice. αC2 represents the subsidies and rewards given by the government to enterprises, including purchase price subsidies for raw rice, upgrading of processing industry lines, sales advertising subsidies, and others, where α represents the subsidy coefficient given by the government to enterprises. βC3 represents the subsidies directly given by the government to farmers, including planting encouragement, subsidies for seeds, fertilizers, agricultural machinery, and other equipment, where β represents the subsidy coefficient given by the government to farmers.
F represents the benefits obtained by enterprises and cooperatives participating in the indigenous rice restoration planting and in-situ conservation projects. C4 represents the cost of purchasing, processing and selling indigenous rice. If an enterprise chooses not to purchase indigenous rice, there may be fewer opportunities for cooperation with the government in the future, and their competitiveness and uniqueness compared with similar enterprises that grow indigenous rice may decrease. Therefore, the loss of the enterprise by not participating in the purchase of indigenous rice is D3. Driven by the minimization of losses and the maximization of profits, enterprises only choose to participate when the net loss is less than the loss incurred when they do not participate, so there is a relationship where C4-F<D3.
P1 represents the property income obtained by farmers participating in indigenous rice. P2 represents other benefits that farmers get from planting indigenous rice, such as the inner satisfaction brought by the improvement of the rural environment and the satisfaction of cultural inheritance. The cost of planting by farmers is denoted as C5.
According to the above parameters, the game matrix of the three stakeholders of the government, enterprises, cooperatives and farmers was constructed, as shown in Table 1.

3.3 Asymptotic stability analysis of the evolutionary games

Unlike traditional games, evolutionary game theory does not require participants to be completely rational, nor does it require complete information conditions. It emphasizes a dynamic equilibrium. In this study, the government, enterprises and farmers were all bounded by rationality in the process of the evolutionary game, there was information asymmetry, and the three game parties continued to learn and adjust their own strategies. Therefore, in this process, the three parties exhibited the dynamic replication process described by evolutionary game theory. In Formula (1), x i is the proportion of a population using pure strategy s i, u s i , x represents the fitness of the pure strategy, and u x , x represents the average fitness.
d x i d t = x i u s i , x − u x , x
This study assumed that A1, A2, and A3 represent the average expected returns of the three stakeholders under the mixed strategy, and t is the evolutionary time of the behavioral strategy. The average expected return of the government is:
A 1 = A 1 a x + A 1 b 1 − x
where A1a represents the expected revenue when the government chooses the incentive strategy, and A1b represents the expected revenue when the government chooses the non-incentive strategy.
A 1 a = G 1 + G 2 − C 1 − α C 2 − β C 3 y z +                 G 1 − D 2 − C 1 − α C 2 y 1 − z +                 G 1 − D 1 + G 2 − C 1 − β C 3 1 − y z +                 G 1 − D 1 − D 2 − C 1 1 − y 1 − z
        A 1 b = G 2 − C 1 y z − C 1 y 1 − z +                       G 2 − C 1 1 − y z − C 1 1 − y 1 − z
From Formulas (2), (3), and (4), the replication dynamic equation when the government selects the incentive strategy is given by Formula (5). The proportions of the government who choose incentives and no incentives were set as x and 1-x, respectively.
F ( x ) = d x d t = A 1 a − A 1 x = x 1 − x D 1 − α C 2 y + D 2 − β C 3 z + G 1 − D 1 − D 2
where the firm’s average expected returnis A2. The replication dynamic equation of enterprises and cooperatives is given by Formula (6). The proportions of the enterprises who choose purchases and no purchases were set as y and 1-y, respectively. The average expected income of farmers is A3, and the replication dynamic equation of farmers is given by Formula (8). The proportions of the farmers who choose planting and no planting were set as z and 1-z, respectively.
A 2 = A 2 a y + A 2 b 1 − y
F ( y ) = d y d t = y 1 − y α C 2 x + F z + C 4 + D 3
A 3 = A 3 a z + A 3 b 1 − z
F ( z ) = d z d t = z 1 − z β C 3 x + P 1 + P 2 − C 5

3.3.1 Copy dynamic equation equilibrium points

According to Formulas (5), (7), and (9), let F ( x ), F ( y ), and F ( z ) be zero, namely:
F ( x ) = x 1 − x D 1 − α C 2 y + D 2 − β C 3 z + G 1 − D 1 − D 2 = 0 F ( y ) = y 1 − y α C 2 x + F z − C 4 + D 3 = 0 F ( z ) = z 1 − z β C 3 x + P 1 + P 2 − C 5 = 0
Then the eight equilibrium evolution points that exist in this tripartite game can be found, which are N1 (1, 1, 1), N2 (1, 1, 0), N3 (1, 0, 0), N4 (1, 0, 1), N5 (0, 1, 1), N6 (0, 1, 0), N7 (0, 0, 1), and N8 (0, 0, 0). The strategy combinations corresponding to the eight equilibrium evolution points are: N1 [incentive, acquisition, planting], N2 [incentive, acquisition, no planting], N3 [incentive, no acquisition, no planting], N4 [incentive, no acquisition, planting], N5 [no incentive, acquisition, planting], N6 [no incentive, acquisition, no planting], N7 [no incentive, no acquisition, planting], and N8 [no incentive, no acquisition, no planting]. When farmers do not plant, cooperatives and enterprises would not be able to purchase indigenous rice. Therefore, the two strategic combinations of N2 [incentive, acquisition, no planting] and N6 [no incentive, acquisition, no planting] were not considered.

3.3.2 System evolution stability strategies

A Jacobian matrix was established to judge the stability point of the system stability strategy. The replication dynamic equation above corresponds to the establishment of the following Jacobian matrix:

J = d F ( x ) d x d F ( x ) d y d F ( x ) d z d F ( y ) d x d F ( y ) d y d F ( y ) d z d F ( z ) d x d F ( z ) d y d F ( z ) d z

= 1 − 2 x D 1 − α C 2 y + D 2 − β C 3 z + G 1 − D 1 − D 2 x 1 − x D 1 − α C 2 x 1 − x D 2 − β C 3 y 1 − y α C 2 1 − 2 y α C 2 x + F z − C 4 + D 3 y 1 − y F z 1 − z β C 3 x 0 1 − 2 z β C 3 x + P 1 + P 2 − C 5
According to the method proposed by Friedman, the evolutionary stability strategy of the game system can be obtained from the local stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the system (Traulsen et al., 2010); and N1 (1, 1, 1), N3 (1, 0, 0), N4 (1, 0, 1), N5 (0, 1, 1), N7 (0, 0, 1), N8 (0, 0, 0) were set as the six equilibrium points, respectively. The six equilibrium points were substituted into the above Jacobian matrix, and the eigenvalue table was obtained (Table 2).
Table 2 Characteristic value table
Equilibrium Eigenvalues Asymptotic stability
λ 1 λ 2 λ 3
N1(1, 1, 1) α C 2 + β C 3 − G 1 C 4 − F − α C 2 − D 3 C 5 − β C 3 − P 1 − P 2 Condition I
N3(1, 0, 0) D 1 + D 2 − G 1 α C 2 − C 4 + D 3 β C 3 + P 1 + P 2 − C 5 Unstable
N4(1, 0, 1) β C 3 − G 1 + D 1 α C 2 − C 4 + D 3 + F C 5 − β C 3 − P 1 − P 2 Unstable
N5(0, 1, 1) G 1 − α C 2 − β C 3 C 4 − D 3 − F C 5 − P 1 − P 2 Condition Ⅱ
N7(0, 0, 1) G 1 − β C 3 − D 1 F − C 4 + D 3 C 5 − P 1 − P 2 Unstable
N8(0, 0, 0) G 1 − D 1 − D 2 D 3 − C 4 P 1 + P 2 − C 5 Unstable
Based on the above assumptions, in order to allow farmers to participate in the planting and protection of indigenous rice, it is necessary to ensure their comprehensive income, which means the following conditions exist:   β C 3 + P 1 + P 2 > C 5, and N3 corresponds to λ 3, while λ 3 = β C 3 + P 1 + P 2 − C 5 ＞ 0, so N3 was an unstable point. The same method was used to conclude that N4, N7, and N8 were also unstable points. Therefore, the process of restoring indigenous rice, protecting indigenous rice, and protecting biodiversity was unsustainable without the governmental guidance and encouragement policies, without the cooperation between enterprises and cooperatives, and without the positive response of farmers. The protection model in which only farmers grow spontaneously without corporate acquisition channels, cooperative assistance, and government subsidies was also unsustainable. Conditions with governmental initiatives and farmers' responses but lacking the participation of enterprises and cooperatives affected the integrity of the primary rice supply chain, which was also unsustainable.
Equilibrium points N1 and N5 needed to satisfy condition I and condition II, respectively, in order to reach the evolutionary steady state. Condition I was α C 2 + β C 3 < G 1, which showed that the sum of government subsidies to enterprises, cooperatives and farmers was less than the governmental intangible public credit gains, and the governmental subsidies to farmers were greater than the net loss of farmers during planting. Condition II was α C 2 + β C 3 > G 1 while C 5 < P 1 + P 2, which showed that the sum of government subsidies to enterprises, cooperatives and farmers was greater than the governmental intangible public credit benefits, and farmers’ planting costs were less than the planting benefits. Therefore, under certain conditions, the strategic combinations of [incentive, acquisition, plant] and [no incentive, acquisition, plant] were stable.
At present, the yield per mu of indigenous rice is much lower than that of hybrid rice. Although the unit price of sales is considerable, the overall economic benefit is still lower than those of hybrid rice and ordinary rice. The rice seeds currently planted come from indigenous rice seeds donated and exchanged between farmers, and there is a lack of high-quality rice seed resources. In the growth process of indigenous rice, it is prone to lodging and ear drop, the level of mechanization in the planting process is low, the labor cost is high, and the planting efficiency is quite different from those of ordinary rice and hybrid rice. In addition, due to the imperfect deep processing line of indigenous rice, the low popularity of the product, and the small base of existing target consumers, government incentives are still needed to encourage enterprises and farmers to participate in protection and planting. Therefore [incentive, acquisition, planting] is currently the best strategy combination.

4 Numerical simulation and optimization

By analyzing the equilibrium point, the stability of the dynamic evolution system of the government, enterprises, and farmers can be obtained. The analysis of the asymptotic stability of the evolutionary game shows that the government, enterprises, and farmers consider comprehensive income when making strategic choices, and the subsidies obtained by enterprises in the process of purchasing and processing Yuanjiang indigenous rice can reduce or even guide their decision-making process. The subsidies received by farmers for planting indigenous rice can increase their enthusiasm for planting. Therefore, this study conducted a simulation analysis of the coefficients α and β. Initially, the ratio was set to x=y=z=0.5 for the government, enterprises and farmers to choose incentives, purchase and planting, and the relevant parameters were set, namely G1 = 6, D1 = 2, D2 = 3, C2 = 3, C3 = 5, F = 6, C4 = 6.5, D3 = 2.5, P1 = 3, P2 = 3, and C5 = 6.5. The initial parameters of α and β were 0.5, and the changes in their individual values were used to simulate the three-party game model in this study using MATLAB software.

4.1 The impact of changes in government subsidies on enterprises

When the value of β was fixed at 0.5, and the value of α was set to 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, or 1, the dynamic process of the evolution of the tripartite subject system was as shown in Fig. 2. With the increase of the governmental subsidy α to the enterprise from 0 to 1, the final selection strategy of the three parties of farmers, enterprises and the government in the game is stable at [incentive, acquisition, planting].
Fig. 2 Evolution of the government, farmers and enterprises under different α changes. (a) Evolution of government under different α; (b) evolution of peasant households under different α; (c) evolution of enterprises under different α
In Fig. 2, note that when the government subsidy coefficient α was 0.25, enterprises tend to choose “no acquisition” first, and then to choose “acquisition” and eventually stabilize. When the government subsidy coefficient α to the enterprise satisfies 0.25 < α ≤ 1, the enterprise maintains the decision of “purchasing indigenous rice”. Analyzing the time for the three subjects to reach the stable strategy, as α increases gradually between 0 and 1, the time for the enterprise to reach the stable selection strategy gradually became shorter. In other words, the greater the government subsidy coefficient to the enterprise, the sooner the selection strategy of maintaining the “acquisition of indigenous rice” was completed; as α gradually increased between 0 and 1, the time for the government to reach a stable selection strategy gradually became longer; but surprisingly, as α gradually increases in the range between 0 and 1, the time for farmers to reach a stable selection strategy gradually became longer.
The governmental subsidy coefficient to enterprises will affect the enthusiasm of farmers to choose to restore the planting of indigenous rice. The reason may be that farmers, as the main body of planting indigenous rice, would see that the enterprises and cooperatives that purchase indigenous rice received higher subsidies than they did. The perception that this situation was unfair and unreasonable would be temporarily generated, but the initial investment of the farmers in planting indigenous rice had been completed. If the planting of indigenous rice was interrupted or the purchase of cooperative enterprises and cooperatives was refused, they would not only lose their initial investment that was completed, but it would also affect the reform. This could lead to the purchase of common rice and hybrid rice after planting, so there was a simulation result that farmers would still tend to “plant” as the choice decision, but the time to reach a stable state became longer.
However, it is undeniable that the governmental subsidy coefficient to enterprises played an important role in the decision-making of enterprises. Under the circumstance that the government subsidy coefficient was small and the government subsidy was small, the enterprise would choose “not to purchase the indigenous rice” in order to make a profit. When the government granted a reasonable range of subsidies to enterprises and cooperatives, this helped to guide market transactions, protected the interests of the enterprises involved in the cultivation and protection of indigenous rice, and protected the indigenous rice varieties in Yuanjiang County, which in turn protected the biodiversity of rice seed resources to a certain extent.

4.2 The influence of the government on the changes in the subsidy intensity of farmers

When the value of α was fixed at 0.5, and the value of β was 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, or 1, the dynamic process of the evolution of the tripartite subject system was as shown in Fig. 3. When the governmental subsidy β to farmers was between 0 and 1 (0 < β < 1), the final selection strategy of the three players in the game was stable at [incentive, acquisition, planting]. When the governmental subsidy β for farmers was equal to 1, the farmers’ choice tended to “planting” at first, and then to “no planting” after a period of time, and the governmental choice directly tended to “no incentive”. With an increase in the subsidy coefficient for farmers, the speed at which farmers, enterprises and cooperatives reached an evolutionary steady state was accelerated, and the speed at which the government reached a steady state was inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient.
Fig. 3 Evolution of the government, farmers and enterprises under different β changes. (a) Evolution of government under different β; (b) evolution of peasant households under different β; (c) evolution of enterprises under different β
For the above simulation situation, we believe that the governmental subsidy to farmers was conducive to promoting farmers’ enthusiasm for planting. Farmers have received subsidies, and the difference between the income from planting indigenous rice and the income from planting ordinary rice and hybrid rice was reduced. The original company was set to obtain a sufficient and stable amount of indigenous rice, so some subsidies should be provided in the purchase process to encourage the farmers. The government subsidies reduced the cost to enterprises and promoted the decision of “acquisition” for the enterprises. The subsidy provided by the government to farmers was critical. When β > 0.75, the system may be difficult to stabilize. Excessive subsidies not only increased the financial burden of the government, but also destroyed the stability of the evolutionary game system of the three parties. Judging from the simulation results, excessive subsidies to farmers, even exceeding the benefits of planting indigenous rice, may cause the farmers to become passive and apathetic, and neglect the management and maintenance of indigenous rice planting.

5 Conclusions and countermeasures

Based on the perspective of stakeholders, this study analyzed the strategy selection and game system stability of the three-party game subjects in the restoration and protection of indigenous rice in Yuanjiang County, and drew several conclusions.
(1) The analysis of the stakeholders in the protection of indigenous rice in Yuanjiang County showed that there are interest-related relationships among the government, enterprises, cooperatives, and farmers. After constructing the tripartite game model, the evolutionary stable state of the system indicated that a close relationship exists between the evolutionary stable state strategy combination and the relative levels of the costs and benefits of each game subject’s behavior choice. N1 [incentive, acquisition, planting] was the optimal strategic combination to achieve the restoration and protection of indigenous rice in the short term, which indicates an urgent need for the encouragement, support, publicity and guidance of the local government.
(2) The numerical simulation of the tripartite evolutionary game system indicated that the governmental subsidy to enterprises and farmers has a close impact on the enthusiasm of enterprises and farmers to purchase and plant indigenous rice. When the governmental subsidy coefficient to enterprises is small, enterprises tend to exhibit “no acquisition”, and when the subsidy coefficient increases, enterprises keep tending toward “acquisition”. The higher the governmental subsidy coefficient to enterprises, the less time is needed for enterprises to reach a stable strategic combination state. The larger the governmental subsidy coefficient to farmers, the faster the two main bodies of farmers, enterprises and cooperatives reach an evolutionary stable state. When the governmental subsidy coefficient to farmers is larger, the government may tend toward “no incentive” for the farmers. The benefits of indigenous rice result in passive apathy and a tendency toward “no planting”.
Therefore, the government should carefully weigh the subsidies given to enterprises, cooperatives and farmers, and make appropriate subsidies based on the local financial situation and the status quo of the restoration and in-situ protection of indigenous rice. Based on this, we can put forward several suggestions from the perspectives of the three subjects.
For the government, firstly, when determining the subsidy ratio of enterprises and cooperatives, it is necessary to consider changes in the mentality of the farmers, so as to reduce the unfair and unbalanced perception among the farmers as the main body of planting. Secondly, the governmental subsidies to farmers should not be too high in order to reduce the negative and apathetic situation of the farmers. Thirdly, the government should pay attention to education and guidance at the level of consciousness, and not only rely on economic subsidies.
For enterprises and cooperatives, they should deeply realize that the long-term, stable and sustainable strategic combination is [no incentives, acquisition, planting], i.e., the planting, acquisition, and sales of indigenous rice form a complete supply chain, and only planting at a certain scale can be achieved, since Yuanjiang indigenous rice products can only occupy a certain market share. At the same time, whether the enterprise can effectively improve the deep processing ability of indigenous rice and the capability of product packaging and publicity is very important for the marketization of Yuanjiang indigenous rice products. In addition, enterprises should pay attention to the exploration of the ecological and humanistic values of indigenous rice, strengthen cooperation with universities and scientific research institutes to highlight the unique advantages of Yuanjiang indigenous rice, and apply for the certification of rice products to find a new path for revitalization and common prosperity.
For farmers, they should improve their understanding and awareness of biodiversity and species diversity, and improve their identification with the national culture and rice farming culture.

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