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Journal of Resources and Ecology >

2023 , Vol. 14 >Issue 6: 1138 - 1147

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2023.06.003

Ecosystem and Ecological Security

Ecological Compensation Assessment from the Perspective of Spatial Game: A Case Study of the Watershed Ecological Compensation in Anhui Section of the Huaihe River Basin, China

  • XING Qinfeng ,
  • ZHANG Mengxue , *
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  • College of Economy and Management, Anhui University of Science and Technology, Huainan, Anhui 232001, China
* ZHANG Mengxue, E-mail:

XING Qinfeng, E-mail:

Received date: 2022-02-20

  Accepted date: 2022-12-20

  Online published: 2023-10-23

Supported by

The Estimation and Action Logic of Ecological Compensation System in Huaihe River Basin of Anhui Province(2022CX072)

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Abstract

The ecological environment has been the favorite subject of ecological security with the aim of ecological restoration, development and utilization. Therefore, a spatial game model was constructed according to the theory of spatial production and the spirit of game theory. Then the methods of Factor Analysis and Multivariate Analysis were used to verify the actual situation of watershed ecological compensation satisfaction in Anhui section of the Huaihe River Basin. The results show that: (1) Government management is still the dominant player in the spatial game, and the satisfaction of both market governance and social governance have significant impacts on its overall satisfaction; and (2) To improve the satisfaction of the spatial game, it is necessary to strengthen its cost control, face up to the status and role of its behavior subjects, and accurately recognize its target groups. The results of this study are helpful for deepening our understanding of watershed ecological compensation, and three viewpoints obtained based on the research results are: creating a new pattern of multiple collaborative constructions, highlighting the new implications of cost co-governance and consolidating the new demand of benefit sharing.

Key words： ecological compensation; spatial production; spatial game; empirical analysis; Anhui section of the Huaihe River Basin

Cite this article

XING Qinfeng , ZHANG Mengxue . Ecological Compensation Assessment from the Perspective of Spatial Game: A Case Study of the Watershed Ecological Compensation in Anhui Section of the Huaihe River Basin, China[J]. Journal of Resources and Ecology, 2023 , 14(6) : 1138 -1147 . DOI: 10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2023.06.003

1 Introduction

The concept of ecological compensation originated from ecosystem services, and it has become the academic hot spot of ecological economics (Costanza, 1997). It originally meant a kind of ecosystem services that are “beneficial to human beings” (Westman, 1977), which is the internalization of external costs for the purpose of controlling ecological damage and the process of fulfilling the obligation of ecological restoration based on the damage to the ecological environment (Zhang, 1995). In other words, ecological compensation is designed to charge (or compensate) the behavior of damaging (or protecting) resources and the environment and to realize the integration of ecological compensation between development and utilization (Mao et al., 2002). Therefore, as a good governance process of ecological restoration, development and utilization, ecological compensation values the precise adjustments of individual behaviors and the scientific integration of overall social interests in the process of ecosystem protection. However, regardless of the benefit adjustment or behavior perfection, ecological compensation cannot be separated from the accurate identification of the internal related objects and the effective intervention of the external complex environment. Therefore, ecological compensation is a kind of spatial production for realizing reproduction in the game process.

2 Literature review

Spatial production is a dominant social critical theory in the 20th century. Karl Marx has an important position in the development of this theory (Zao, 1995). He believed that “space is an essential factor for all production and all human activities.” In other words, with the development of social productivity, space has become an important factor of production. Of course, the space or the production of space at that time was mainly the conceptual narrative of historical materialism (Sun, 2020). From the perspective of philosophical implications, the pioneering research results of spatial production had formed (Henri, 1991; Lefebvre, 2003; Li and Qin, 2011; Yang and Ding, 2016). Lefebvre (2003) critically inherited thoughts on space, put forward the concept of “spatial production” and believed that “capitalism has survived and developed through new spatial production, and the reproduction of capitalist relations of production has continued in the form of spatial production”. However, “spatial production does not refer to the material production within the space, nor can space only be regarded as a vessel and medium for material production, but it refers to the production of space itself”. Otherwise, Desetto is more inclined to regulate spatial production through the classification and division of spatial practice and even spatial game, so as to realize the self-strengthening of spatial value (Sun and Zhou, 2014). More attention has focused on reducing all kinds of oppression and injustice through effective spatial production in order to achieve spatial justice (Xia, 2020). Harvey also had an important influence on the development of “spatial production”. He not only inherited spatial justice, but also put forward environmental justice under its implications (David, 2002).
Game theory, published by Von Neumann and Morgan Stein in 1944, is considered to be in its infancy as a mathematical model, although the work of Tucker, Nash and Shapley laid the theoretical foundation of game theory (Xie, 2001). Its attention to action steps and information problems allows game analysis to have a richer model structure. In other words, in the process of the broad applications of game theory in economics, sociology and politics, “Classical game theory”, such as mathematical game theory and analytic game theory, has been gradually formed. Generally speaking, the strategic interactions of two or more participants with a specific purpose and utility are mainly discussed, and the possible consequences are caused by their rational behavior for maximizing utility (income) under this background.
In this study, the spatial production theory and the spirit of game theory will be combined to analyze the actual situation of ecological compensation in the Anhui section of the Huaihe River Basin, China, and to optimize its spatial game through empirical evidence. Then, suggestions for improving its governance system and governance capacity will be provided.

3 Research design

3.1 Study area

The Anhui section of the Huaihe River Basin is selected as the analysis object. It flows from Honghe in Funan County to Xiaoliuxianghe in Mingguang City. It is located between the Yangtze River and the Yellow River with good climatic and topographic conditions. Furthermore, it is one of the regions with the greatest development potential in the central and eastern parts of China. Additionally, the heavy chemical and mining industries in Bengbu and Huainan are relatively developed, resulting in a large amount of industrial waste water discharge which has seriously affected the ecosystem security of the middle and lower reaches of the Huaihe River. As a result, its ecological environmental situation is very serious. In recent years, although the basic laws, regulations and related policies of watershed ecological compensation have been improving, there is still a lack of specific guidance on the complex and dynamic behavior of the main subjects, and its governance effect is not ideal. Therefore, the service capacity of the ecological environment remains weakened and the sustainable development of the basin is restricted.
On October 18, 2018, the State Council issued the Development Plan for the Huaihe River Ecological Economic Belt. According to the plan, efforts should be made to improve the watershed ecological compensation in the Huaihe River Basin, such as constructing a trans-administrative regional watershed ecological compensation mechanism and promoting the establishment of a watershed ecological compensation mechanism in the Huaihe River Basin.
Therefore, as the key of ecological compensation in the middle and lower reaches of the Huaihe River, the effects of spatial production on the internal mechanism, game space and practical path of watershed ecological compensation should be explored. These considerations are conducive to protecting the ecological environment in the Huaihe River Basin.

3.2 Construction of the indicator system

The dynamic game of spatial production (hereinafter referred to as spatial game) is designed to intercept some of the fragments, plots and stories in order to present general rules, and generate practical explanations and behavior predictions (Wang, 2016). It should be focused on three core elements. First, the complexity and dynamics of the spatial game process should be correctly understood. Second, the survival situation, strategic space and the costs and benefits of the main body in the spatial game should be accurately analyzed. Third, scientific predictions and intervention activities can be carried out based on the logical correlations between the many elements of spatial production. Based on this, the analysis framework and its indicator system can be built based on five variables.
(1) Dependent variable: Satisfaction of the spatial game of watershed ecological compensation
The satisfaction of the spatial game of ecological compensation not only pays attention to the focus of relevant elements, responsibilities and cost internalization within the region, but it also pays attention to the construction of the spatial justice paradigm (Wang et al., 2006; Muradian, 2010). Among them, the satisfaction of ecological compensation is used to ensure free trade between the providers and buyers in the “field” of the spatial game, so as to optimize the “transparent system of paying for additional environmental services with conditions” for voluntary providers of ecosystem services (Tacconi, 2012). Furthermore, the remodeling of the participation mechanism and coordination of interest relations is emphasized based on individuals, non-governmental organizations, private organizations and the government (Porras et al., 2008). Therefore, the satisfaction of ecological compensation is not only a physical avoidance of “negative externalities”, but also a paradigm reconstruction of spatial justice (environmental justice) at the superstructure level. Otherwise, by focusing on the research purport of “Coase theory”, one finds that the satisfaction of ecological compensation cannot be adequately dealt with without the avoidance of “negative externalities” of the spatial game; that is, to continuously improve their own satisfaction through the identification of compensation objects, constraints of the trading market and the intervention of performance evaluation (Xiao and Pan, 2016; Xie and Li, 2016; Yan and Liu, 2018; Zhu et al., 2018; Deng et al., 2019; Liu, 2019). Additionally, by focusing on the research purport of “Pigou theory” and the satisfaction of ecological compensation, the clear path of rights and responsibilities based on “Coase Theory” is an important way to effectively avoid the “negative externalities” of the spatial game. Meanwhile, the means of payment, reasonable negative externality taxation, accurate control of compensation objects, and scientific measurement of compensation efficiency are also very important (Chen et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2019; Liu and Yang, 2019). Furthermore, the intervention or incentive effect is more significant, and its satisfaction can be achieved through environmental justice. Finally, thinking from the perspective of social governance is initiated, and then multiple participation, regional coordination and social capital integration and other social governance mechanisms were used to improve the intervention effect of the spatial game, as well as their own satisfaction (Cai and Li, 2016; Jin and Wu, 2018; Zhang et al., 2018; Du and Che, 2019; Jiang and You, 2019; Zeng et al., 2019).
Therefore, in the specific design, the “satisfaction of the spatial game of watershed ecological compensation” is operated into “Are you satisfied with the current spatial game of watershed ecological compensation”, and its overall satisfaction is evaluated through three secondary indicators of market governance satisfaction, government management satisfaction and social governance satisfaction. Among them, the satisfaction of market governance includes five observation indicators: identification of compensation object, constraints of trading market, intervention of performance evaluation, completed contractual relationship and shaping of the legal path. The score range is 1-9 points, where 1 is very dissatisfied, 3 is relatively dissatisfied, 5 is satisfied, 7 is relatively satisfied and 9 is very satisfied. The satisfaction of government management includes four observation indicators: clear government payment means, negative externality taxation, precise control of compensation objects, and scientific measurement of compensation efficiency. It is assigned a score ranging from 1-9, where 1 is very dissatisfied, 3 is relatively dissatisfied, 5 is satisfied, 7 is relatively satisfied, and 9 is very satisfied. The satisfaction of social governance includes three observation indexes of multiple participation, regional collaboration and social capital integration, with possible scores of 1-9, where 1 is very dissatisfied, 3 is relatively dissatisfied, 5 is satisfied, 7 is relatively satisfied, and 9 is very satisfied.
(2) Independent variable (a): Behavior subjects
The behavior subjects of watershed ecological compensation are the initiators, promoters and leaders of its spatial production, and they include the government, enterprises, social organizations and the people. So the division of responsibilities in the game process of space must be clear to perfect the working mechanisms, especially the “planning” to determine major projects, key projects and major policies. Furthermore, the socio-economic development and ecological environmental protection are closely linked to ensure that the domain implements the tasks and goals of watershed ecological compensation. Then, the watershed ecological compensation in the Anhui section of the Huaihe River Basin can be actively promoted to either a good stable state or regional transformation, so as to maximize the spatial game utility (income).
Therefore, the indicator of “behavior subjects” is further operated into “Are you satisfied with the multiple behavior subjects in the process of the spatial game of watershed ecological compensation?” and assigned a value of 1-9 points, where 1 is very dissatisfied, 3 is relatively dissatisfied, 5 is satisfied, 7 is relatively satisfied, and 9 is very satisfied.
(3) Independent variable (b): Cost control
Because the utility (income) of the spatial game of watershed ecological compensation depends on the degree of acceptance among target groups and is not easy to control, it has characteristics of complexity and repeatability. Thus, as one of the core rational behaviors of the spatial game, the interpretation or prediction function of cost control based on the watershed ecological compensation in the Anhui section of the Huaihe River Basin is more prominent, and the satisfaction of cost control has become the core reference point for spatial game optimization of the watershed ecological compensation. Furthermore, from the perspective of the spatial practice in Fuyang, Luan, Huainan and Bengbu, especially the latter two, due to their involvement in mineral mining and energy processing, they are faced with very heavy tasks and great difficulties in winning the three major battles of preventing and resolving major risks, accurately eliminating poverty and pollution prevention. Therefore, cost control has a greater impact on the target groups and more practical operational significance.
Thus, the indicator of “cost control” is further operated to measure “Are you satisfied with the cost control of the current game process of watershed ecological compensation”, and assigned a value of 1-9 points, where 1 is very dissatisfied, 3 is relatively dissatisfied, 5 is satisfied, 7 is relatively satisfied, and 9 is very satisfied.
(4) Independent variable (c): Target groups
Classical game theory emphasizes “the interactions of two or more players in strategy”. In other words, the spatial game of watershed ecological compensation is not only the interactions between the subjects of behavior in the domain, but also the interactions between behavior subjects and target groups. Therefore, in considering the ecological compensation in the Anhui section of the Huaihe River Basin, it is indispensable for the target groups to form benign interactions with behavior subjects, so as to improve the people’s livelihood and build a “stable state” or “stable region”. Additionally, their extensive participation is also of positive significance to the spatial game itself, especially to the realization of the “stable state” and the advancement of the “stable region”.
Thus, the indicator of “target groups” is further operated to measure “Are you satisfied with the target groups in the current spatial game of watershed ecological compensation” and assigned a value of 1-9 points, where 1 is very dissatisfied, 3 is relatively dissatisfied, 5 is satisfied, 7 is relatively satisfied, and 9 is very satisfied.
(5) Control variables
In order to explore the degree of independence of the independent variables on the dependent variables, the gender, ages and education levels are selected as three control variables. Among them, gender is set as a dichotomous dummy variable, where male is 1 and female is 0. Age is a sequential variable (1 for 18 and under, 2 for 19 to 35, 3 for 36 to 60, and 4 for 61 and over). When the regression model is included, ages are converted to dummy variables, with 1 as the reference frame for age 18 and under, and 0/1 coded dummy variables for other age groups. Education levels are also converted into dummy variables when included in the regression model. Primary school and below is set as the reference frame, while junior high school, senior high school and university and above are set as 0/1 coded dummy variables.

3.3 Research hypothesis

Based on the above analysis, the independent variables and dependent variable required for the study are obtained and four hypotheses are formed.
Hypothesis H0: The “satisfaction of the spatial game of watershed ecological compensation” is defined as Y0. Furthermore, Hypothesis H0 has three specific contents.
a) The satisfaction of market governance is defined as Y1, including five observation indicators of satisfaction of compensation object identification (Y11), satisfaction of trading market (Y12), satisfaction of performance evaluation (Y13), satisfaction of contractual relationship (Y14), and satisfaction of legal environment (Y15). It is supposed that Y1 has a positive correlation with Y0 through all of them.
b) The satisfaction of government management is defined as Y2, including government payment means satisfaction (Y21), negative externalities taxation satisfaction (Y22), compensation object control satisfaction (Y23), and compensation efficiency measurement satisfaction (Y24). It is supposed that that Y2 has a positive correlation with Y0 through all of them.
c) The satisfaction of social governance is defined as Y3, including three observation indicators of multiple participation satisfaction (Y31), regional collaborative satisfaction (Y32) and social capital integration satisfaction (Y33). It is supposed that Y3 has a positive correlation with Y0 through all of them.
Hypothesis H1: The satisfaction of “behavior subjects” is defined as X1. It is supposed that X1 is positively correlated with Y0.
Hypothesis H2: The satisfaction of “cost control” is defined as X2. It is supposed that X2 has a positive correlation with Y0.
Hypothesis H3: The satisfaction of “target group” is defined as X3. It is supposed that X3 has a positive correlation with Y0.
Furthermore, the specific operational descriptions of the relevant constants, dependent variable, potential variables and their observed indicators are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 Indicator operation assignment table
Indicator name Indicator definition Indicator description Indicator assignment
Gender Constant Gender involves two parameters: Male, female “Male”=“1”;
“Female”=“0”
Age Constant Age involves four parameters:
“0-18 years old ”, “19-35 years old ”,
“36-60 years old”, “61 years old and over”		 “0-18 years old”=“1”;
“19-35 years old”=“2”;
“36-60 years old”=“3”;
“61 years and older”=“4”
Education Constant Education involves six observation parameters:
“Primary school and below”, “junior high school”,
“high school”, “university and above”		 “Primary school and below”= “1”;
“Junior high school”= “2”;
“High School”=“3”;
“University and above”=“4”
Satisfaction of “the spatial game of watershed ecological compensation” Y0 Y0 measured by independent variable Y and X -
Satisfaction of “market governance” Y1 Y1 involves five observation indicators and they are measured by the Likert scale as follows:
Satisfaction of compensation object identification (Y11),
Satisfaction of trading market (Y12),
Satisfaction of performance evaluation (Y13),
Satisfaction of contractual relationship (Y14),
Satisfaction of legal environment (Y15)		 “Very dissatisfied” = “1”;
“Relatively dissatisfied” = “3”;
“Satisfied” = “5”;
“Relatively satisfied” = “7”;
“Very satisfied” = “9”
Satisfaction of “government management” Y2 Y2 involves four observation indicators and they are measured by the Likert scale as follows:
Government payment means satisfaction (Y21),
Negative externalities taxation satisfaction (Y22),
Compensation object control satisfaction (Y23),
Compensation efficiency measurement satisfaction (Y24)
Satisfaction of “social governance” Y3 Y3 involves three observation indicators and they are measured by the Likert scale as follows:
Multiple participation satisfaction (Y31),
Regional collaborative satisfaction (Y32),
Social capital integration satisfaction (Y33)
Satisfaction of “behavior subjects” X1 -
Satisfaction of “cost control” X2 -
Satisfaction of “target group” X3 -

3.4 Data collection

The data used in this study were obtained from the field surveys in Fuyang, Luan, Huainan and Bengbu conducted from July to December in 2019. Considering the research area, economic status and population distribution, as well as the difficulty of carrying out the surveys, the ordinary residents, enterprise employees and government civil servants were selected as the survey objects.
According to the principle of stratified sampling and simple random sampling, Fuyang, Luan, Huainan and Bengbu are first selected as the sample units. For each city, groups of 4-6 sample areas or district level counties, 4-6 streets or towns in each district or district level counties, and 40-80 households were selected for one-on-one questionnaire interviews. A total of 1000 employees and 600 civil servants were selected. A total of 5600 questionnaires were issued and collected during this time. After validity testing and the elimination of invalid samples, a total of 5591 samples were used for the analysis, for an effective rate of 99.8%.

4 Results

4.1 Factor analysis

Factor characteristic values, contribution rates and cumulative contribution rates are mainly estimated by factor analysis, and the load amounts and common degrees of 12 observation variables are observed (were determined) as shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Factor analysis of the spatial game of watershed ecological compensation
Y1
a=1.018, b=19.145%		 Y2
a=1.287, b=28.275%		 Y3
a=1.017, b=15.648%
Factor Load capacity Commonality Factor Load capacity Commonality Factor Load capacity Commonality
Y11 0.647 0.636 Y21 0.759 0.671 Y31 0.721 0.651
Y12 0.702 0.689 Y22 0.662 0.687 Y32 0.657 0.673
Y13 0.705 0.697 Y23 0.718 0.659 Y33 0.639 0.651
Y14 0.695 0.628 Y24 0.729 0.651 －
Y15 0.677 0.642
c=66.068%

Note: a is the factor characteristic value, b is the factor contribution rate, and c is the factor cumulative contribution rate.

In Table 2, the factor eigenvalues are greater than 1, and the cumulative contribution rate reaches 69.669%, which indicates representativeness to a certain extent. Thus, the variance contribution rate is taken as the weight of each factor, multiplied by the score of each factor, and the total score Y0 is then obtained. In order to describe the statistical analysis and avoid the inherent deviation of the regression model, the Y0 score is converted into an index value between 1 and 100.

4.2 Multiple regressions

The satisfaction of the spatial game of watershed ecological compensation is a continuous numerical variable, and the independent variables are multiple variables, so the multiple linear regression statistical method is adopted. Based on the model of the control variables, the three variables of behavior subjects, cost control and target groups were ultimately included, and four nested models were constructed to test the relationship hypothesis. The results are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Multiple regression analysis of the spatial game of watershed ecological compensation
Variable name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
X1 0.469** 0.346** 0.364*
X2 0.487** 0.448*
X3 0.349***
Gender (female =0) 0.373*** 0.376** 0.381* 0.378***
Age
Under 18 years old (reference)
19 to 35 years old 0.229* 0.345** 0.342*** 0.351**
36 to 60 years old 0.348** 0.265 0.275* 0.257**
Over 60 years old 0.275 0.286 0.267 0.228
Education level
Primary school and below (reference)
Junior high school ‒0.207 0.209 0.215 0.221
High school 0.229 0.231** 0.258* 0.269
University and above” 0.342** 0.469* 0.421** 0.321*
F value 6.121* 7.647* 7.523** 6.604***
Adjusted R2 0.232 0.247 0.243 0.261
Sample size 5591 5591 5591 5591

Note: *P<0.1, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01.

The data in Table 3 show that the overall model passed the significance test and the fitting degree is good in model 1. Gender, age (“19-35 years old”, and “36-60 years old”), and education level (“University or above”) pass the significance test. There is a positive correlation between male and Y0, which is 0.373 times the reference frame. Age (“19-35 years old”, and “36-60 years old”) is positively correlated with Y0, which are 0.229 times and 0.348 times the reference frame, respectively. There is a positive correlation between Y0 and education level of “university or above”, which is 0.342 times the reference frame.
Based on model 1, model 2 incorporates variable X1. X1 passes the significance test, and the relationship hypothesis H1 passes the validation. For each level’s increase in X1, the satisfaction of Y0 increases by 0.469 times. Of the control variables, gender, age (“19-35 years old”) and education (“high school”, and “University and above”) pass the significance test, and are 0.376, 0.345, 0.231 and 0.469 times the corresponding reference values, respectively.
Based on model 2, model 3 includes variable X2. X2 passes the significance test, and H2 passes the test. The satisfaction of Y0 increases by 0.487 times when X2 increases by 1 unit. Additionally, compared with model 2, the influence of variable X1 is reduced. Furthermore, of the control variables, gender, age (“19-35 years old”, and “36-60 years old”) and education level (“High school”, and “University and above”) pass the significance test, and are 0.381, 0.342, 0.275, 0.258 and 0.421 times the values of the corresponding reference systems, respectively.
Based on model 3, model 4 includes variable X3. X3 passes the significance test and H3 passes the test. For every unit increase in X3, the satisfaction of Y0 increases by 0.349 times. Additionally, compared with model 3, the influence of variable X1 is increased, while the effect of variable X2 is less than in model 3. Additionally, the control variables gender, age (“19-35 years old”, and “36-60 years old”) and education level (“University and above”) pass the significance test, and are 0.378, 0.351, 0.257 and 0.321 times the values of the corresponding reference systems, respectively.

5 Discussion

Through factor analysis and multiple regression analysis, the hypotheses above are established. Among them, the result of factor exploration analysis shows that government management is still the dominant player in the basin spatial game, and the satisfaction of both market governance and social governance have significant impacts on the overall satisfaction. Of course, other variables and their observation indicators cannot be ignored. Furthermore, the results of the multiple regression analysis shows that more attention should be paid to the independent variable “cost control” than the independent variables “behavior subjects” and “target groups”. Additionally, when the other two variables are included, the influence of “behavior subjects” on the overall satisfaction of watershed ecological compensation is complex. When many control variables are included, the gender, age and education level groups have different requirements for the independent variables.
Whether considering the watershed ecological compensation of the Anhui section in the Huaihe River Basin or other basins, the following knowledge focus should be formed in terms of the actual situation of spatial game.
(1) It is necessary to strengthen the cost control of spatial game.
The satisfaction of the spatial game of watershed ecological compensation is inseparable from the cost control of the spatial game. The spatial game here mainly follows the relevant contents and guiding spirit of “Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Improving the Compensation Mechanism for Ecological Protection” (GBFA [2016] No. 31) to strengthen its own cost control and highlight the new implications of cost co-governance.
This is shown in three key aspects. First, the cost evaluation of watershed ecological compensation should be strengthened. According to modern management philosophy, there is no management without evaluation. Only by realizing the cost assessment and quantifying it can the spatial game effectively avoid the “negative externalities” of watershed ecological compensation, and realize the scientific identification and effective implementation of cost control. Second, the input mechanism of watershed ecological compensation should be improved. Although cost control is the original problem of watershed ecological compensation, the key to cost control is still to raise funds through multiple channels and increase compensation efforts in view of the current spatial game dilemma. As for raising funds according to the opinion, it is necessary not only to strengthen the central financial support, but also to promote the horizontal fund intervention. This is necessary so that the relevant subjects and similar subjects in the specific field of the spatial game can actively participate in it in order to ensure the effective completion of the watershed ecological compensation fund raising target within the domain. Furthermore, the cost control of the key watershed ecological compensation should not only be strengthened, but its precise application should also be emphasized. In this way, limited funds can be used to complete the balance of income and expenditure and behavioral guidance of the key watershed compensation objects. Third, the cost control of watershed ecological compensation cannot be separated from policy coordination and legal construction. In the process of intra-regional watershed ecological compensation, cost control not only depends on the traditional market mechanism and government mechanism, but it also needs innovative cooperative policies. In that case, the enthusiasm of the spatial game can be mobilized and then participate in cost control. Of course, cost control is also inseparable from the standardization and institutionalization of their operations. In this way, the efficiency of cost control can be improved, and a good order of spatial production can be maintained.
(2) It is critical to face up to the status and role of behavior subjects.
The behavior subjects should correctly deal with their own interests, in addition to enriching the governance concept, improving the working mechanism and expanding the spatial production of watershed ecological compensation through “co-construction”. Only then can the efficient governance of environmental justice be realized. Only in this way, can the transformation of the spatial game be actively promoted to a stable state or region in order to create a new pattern of “government governance, social adjustment and enterprise autonomy”, as well as providing a strong institutional guarantee for the fundamental improvement of the ecological environment, the construction of ecological civilization and a beautiful China.
This is shown in the following three aspects. First, the party and government should fully understand the purpose of watershed ecological compensation. To a certain extent, the spatial production of watershed ecological compensation is a major political issue related to the governance of the country, as well as a major social issue related to the national economy and people’s livelihood. As the core behavior subjects, the Party and the government should play not only the leading role, but also the role of service provider. In other words, they should give full play to the function of government management in the process of the spatial game, formulate relevant policies to improve the multiple participation mechanism of watershed ecological compensation, and safeguard and protect the rights and interests of the behavior subjects. Second, other behavior subjects should face up to their own pursuit of economic interests, adopt a positive behavioral posture, accurately target the original demands of the spatial game, and improve the palatability of watershed ecological compensation in the domain, while not harming the interest demands of the target groups. Only in this way, can the other behavior subjects and the core behavior subjects form a consensus and experience of responsibility in the process of the spatial game, have more determination and confidence to avoid the “negative externalities” of watershed ecological compensation, and truly realize the spatial production of “bluer sky, greener mountains, cleaner water and more beautiful environment”. Third, it is necessary to promote the identity of the subject among the target groups. In the process of the spatial game, the rights and interests of the target groups need to be effectively protected. Only in this way, can they realize their own behavioral role transformation and behavioral method improvement in time. If their motivation and mode of behavior can be adequately and effectively dealt with, this will be conducive to the creation of a new system and mechanism “jointly built” by all behavior subjects (including target groups) and it will boost spatial reproduction.
(3) It is indispensable to accurately recognize the target groups of the spatial game.
During the spatial game, it is necessary to accurately recognize the target groups, adopt the correct and targeted strategies, clarify the value demands of the target groups, and fully coordinate and meet their interest demands. Only in this way, can the strategic determination of watershed ecological compensation be built to “explore a new way of high-quality development with ecological priority and green development”, and “fight well the political war, people’s livelihood war and critical battle”. Only then, can the spatial production of watershed ecological compensation be expanded in the basin.
This is shown in the following three aspects. First, the individual differences of target groups should be accurately identified. For example, in the process of the spatial game, the knowledge ability, risk awareness, age and experience of the target groups must be accurately identified. As in the system of information interaction process, the players need to use precision intervention strategies to get more target groups identified in the domain of watershed ecological compensation. Second, accurately identify the interest demands of the target groups. In the process of the spatial game, both sides of the game, especially the behavior subjects, must fully listen to the target groups and respond positively. If the rights and interests of the target groups and the behavior subjects are “co-governed” and “shared”, they will both actively participate in the behavioral decision-making and interest game, and then establish the consciousness of spatial production within the domain that “Not claiming credit but always making sure to contribute their share to the success of the cause”. Third, the target groups can be accurately identified as the space. In the process of watershed ecological compensation, both sides of the game, especially the behavior subjects, should improve the “Positive-sum game”, avoid the “Zero-sum game” and put an end to the “Negative-sum game”. In this way, the target groups can reduce the possible losses caused by an improper spatial game, and improve the pertinence and effectiveness of watershed ecological compensation.

6 Conclusions

As an integral part of the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity in the new era, the spatial production of watershed ecological compensation should be guided by Xi Jinping’s socialist ideology with China’s characteristics in the new era. In this way, the precise control of related elements can be realized in the process of the spatial game, the level of efficient governance can be improved, the source governance of individual behavior and overall social interests can be realized in the process of the spatial practice, and a joint effort to demonstrate environmental justice can be formed.
First, the concept of including people’s livelihood, in that good ecology is the well-being of people’s livelihood, should be established. To some extent, “environment is people’s livelihood, green mountains are beauty, and blue sky is happiness.” Only when the principle of cost control can be adhered to and the concept of environmental justice with the maintenance of the interests of the target groups as the core is taken into account in the process of the spatial game, can the problems of the maintenance of their rights and interests, the maintenance of their interests and the stimulation of their motivation be actively solved, in order to optimize the methods of watershed ecological compensation and realize the spatial production of high-quality ecological products and services.
Second, the scientific developmental concept of harmonious coexistence between man and nature should be firmly upheld. Man and nature are a community of life, and building a green home is the common dream of mankind. Therefore, both parties in the game, especially the multiple behavior subjects with government management as the main body, should stick to the development principles of following nature, conforming to nature and protecting nature, in order to realize the quiet, harmonious and beautiful watershed ecological compensation spatial reproduction in the domain through the benign interaction of the spatial game. Furthermore, protecting the ecological environment means protecting the productive forces, and improving the ecological environment means developing the productive forces. Therefore, the harmony and unity of various elements in the watershed ecological compensation should be realized, and the synergistic symbiosis between humans and nature through the mutual influence and mutual promotion of all actors should be promoted.
Third, it is necessary to adhere to the strategic thinking in order to complete the systematic planning of the activities of watershed ecological compensation. As an important part of the construction of ecological civilization, the special production of watershed ecological compensation should be inherited from the “five civilizations” of politics, economy and society, and also be in line with the “five systems” of ecological civilization. In this way, the target groups can form the strategic wisdom of observing the general trend and seeking major events in the process of spatial practice, so that they can be good at the systematic planning of big accounts, long-term accounts, overall accounts and comprehensive accounts.
Finally, applying speculative reason to perfect the new system of modern environmental governance is inevitable. To some extent, there is no inherent paradox between watershed ecological compensation and regional social and economic development, and there is a green development path of common prosperity. Furthermore, as an important part of the modern environmental governance system, the spatial game of watershed ecological compensation should be strengthened by the connections of multiple participation mechanisms, the coordination of multi-dimensional interest relations, and the coupling of multiple motivational sources, so as to eliminate departmentalism and mountain-top actions. Only in this way, can a “new social governance pattern of co-construction, co-governance and sharing” of production compensation be truly created in the region, so that the modernized transformation of its spatial production governance system and governance capacity can be realized.

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