Journal of Resources and Ecology >
Research on the Optimization of Capital for the Governance of Bulk Coal in BeijingTianjinHebei Region
Received date: 20180805
Accepted date: 20181121
Online published: 20190128
Supported by
National Environmental Protection Strategy Decision Support (2023040019).
Copyright
Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei each contributed to the comprehensive governance of bulk coal to treat bulk coal pollution in a mutually beneficial way in 2017. The cooperative game theory is used in this paper to study the environmental benefits and cost effectiveness brought about by this comprehensive governance strategy, primarily focusing on the issue of how to maximize the environmental benefits by choosing an appropriate strategy since the benefits to Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei are closely related. Therefore, the linear optimization, game theory and Shapley value method in the cooperative game model are used to find the ways to minimize the total governance cost of bulk coal in the three areas. In addition, the issues of how to carry out rational distribution and transfer of governance capital among the three places are explored according to the actual amounts of consumption of bulk coal, the influence of the coal burning on the PM_{2.5} and the actual cost of coal governance in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei in 2017. The results show that the governance task in Hebei Province is the most onerous, and requires more investment than the other two cities. Thus, it requires the support from other two cities, with the amount of increased capital required of about 600 million Yuan. At the same time, the cost saved after optimization in Tianjin is calculated to be the largest, which thus can be adjusted appropriately and allocated to Hebei for the governance of bulk coal. The model constructed in this paper can not only be used to solve the issues related to bulk coal consumption in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, but also to carry out the effective distribution of capital, by which a winwin scenario among the three places can be achieved.
DU Xiaolin , FENG Xiangzhao , ZHAO Mengxue , WANG Min . Research on the Optimization of Capital for the Governance of Bulk Coal in BeijingTianjinHebei Region[J]. Journal of Resources and Ecology, 2019 , 10(1) : 48 55 . DOI: 10.5814/j.issn.1674764X.2019.01.006
Table 1 Symbols and parameters in the Cooperative Game Model 
Name & unit  Symbols 

Annual bulk coal consumption in a region (10^{4} t)  N_{i} 
The total amount of bulk coal replaced in a region (10^{4} t)  N_{0}_{i} 
The annual amount of coal replaced in a region (10^{4} t)  N_{ki} 
The PM_{2.5} concentration in a region (μg m^{3})  a_{i} 
The proportional contribution of bulk coal to the PM_{2. 5} concentration in the region  α_{i.} 
The proportional contribution of bulk coal of other places to the PM_{2.5} concentration in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei  β_{i} 
The target PM_{2.5} concentration in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei in 2020 (μg m^{3})  a_{0} 
The unit cost for replacing bulk coal with clean briquette in a region (Yuan t^{1})  X_{1i} 
The unit cost for replacing bulk coal with gas in a region (Yuan t^{1})  X_{2i} 
The unit cost for replacing bulk coal with electricity in a region (Yuan t^{1})  X_{3i} 
The proportion of bulk coal replaced by clean briquette/gas/electricity respectively in a region  γ_{1i}/γ_{2i}/γ_{3i} 
The proportional constant of the amount of bulk coal consumption and the PM_{2. 5} concentration  l_{i} 
The cost per year in a region after optimization (10^{4} Yuan)  T_{ki} 
The total cost in a region after optimization (10^{4} Yuan)  T_{0i} 
The total cost after optimization (10^{4} Yuan)  T 
The total cost before optimization (10^{4} Yuan)  T_{0} 
The transfer volume of the fund (10^{4} Yuan)  E_{i} 
Note: the values of i are 1, 2 and 3, referring to Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei respectively; k refers to the year. 
Table 2 The amount and proportion of subsidies in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei (Unit: Yuan t^{1}) 
Region  Subsidy  Coal to gas  Coal to electricity  Bulk coal to briquette  Total 

Beijing  Input cost  4400  18330  1200  23930 
The amount of subsidy  1330  11866  600  13796  
Proportion (%)  30  64  50  /  
Tianjin  Input cost  4400  18330  1000  23730 
The amount of subsidy  1330  11866  500  13696  
Proportion (%)  30  64  50  /  
Hebei  Input cost  4400  15000  900  20300 
The amount of subsidy  1200  9800  300  11300  
Proportion (%)  27  65  33  / 
Table 3 Governance cost and the amount of bulk coal to be replaced 
Region  Beijing  Tianjin  Hebei  Total 

Governance cost (10^{6} Yuan)  717.392  712.192  1356  2785.584 
The amount of bulk coal to be replaced by 2020 (10^{4} t)  520  520  1200  2240 
The proportion of the amount of bulk coal to be replaced to the total amount for the region (%)  23  23  54  / 
Table 4 Cost comparison before and after optimization (Unit: 10^{8} Yuan) 
Region  Beijing  Tianjin  Hebei  Total 

Cost before the optimization  725  720  1350  2795 
Cost after the optimization  717.392  712.192  1356  2785.584 
Capital saved  7.608  7.808  6  9.416 
Table 5 The distribution of cooperative benefit in Beijing (Unit: 10^{8} Yuan) 
Region  {Beijing}  {Beijing, Tianjin}  {Beijing, Hebei}  {Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei} 

W(S)  1/3  1/6  1/6  1/3 
V(S)  0  7.7796  7.875  9.416 
V(Si)  0  0  0  6.4844 
V(S)  V(Si)  0  7.7796  7.875  2.9316 
W(S) × [V(S)  V(Si)]  0  1.2966  1.3125  0.9772 
Total  3.5863 
Table 6 The distribution of cooperative benefit in Tianjin (Unit: 10^{8} Yuan) 
Region  {Tianjin}  {Beijing, Tianjin}  {Tianjin, Hebei}  {Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei} 

W(S)  1/3  1/6  1/6  1/3 
V(S)  0  7.7796  6.4152  9.416 
V(Si)  0  0  0  7.1642 
V(S)  V(Si)  0  7.7796  6.4152  2.2518 
W(S) × [V(S)  V(Si)]  0  1.2966  1.0692  0.7506 
Total  3.1164 
Table 7 The distribution of cooperative benefit in Hebei (Unit: 10^{8} Yuan) 
Region  {Hebei}  {Beijing, Hebei}  {Tianjin, Hebei}  {Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei} 

W(S)  1/3  1/6  1/6  1/3 
V(S)  0  7.875  6.4152  9.416 
V(Si)  0  0  0  2.1991 
V(S)  V(Si)  0  7.875  6.4152  11.6151 
W(S) × [V(S)  V(Si)]  0  1.3125  1.0692  3.8717 
Total  6.2534 
The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
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