Journal of Resources and Ecology ›› 2021, Vol. 12 ›› Issue (5): 581-592.DOI: 10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2021.05.001
• Human Activities and Ecological Security • Next Articles
CAO Zhiying*(), WANG Liangjian, WU Jiahao
Received:
2021-03-15
Accepted:
2021-05-31
Online:
2021-09-30
Published:
2021-11-30
Contact:
CAO Zhiying
CAO Zhiying, WANG Liangjian, WU Jiahao. Does the Environmental Supervision System Improve Air Quality in China? An Empirical Study using the Difference-in-Differences Model[J]. Journal of Resources and Ecology, 2021, 12(5): 581-592.
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URL: http://www.jorae.cn/EN/10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2021.05.001
Region | Establishment year | Coverage area |
---|---|---|
East | 2002 | Shanghai, Jiangsu*, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong |
South | 2002 | Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong*, Guangxi, Hainan |
Northwest | 2006 | Shaanxi*, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang |
Southwest | 2006 | Chongqing, Sichuan*, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet |
Northeast | 2006 | Liaoning*, Jilin, Heilongjiang |
North | 2008 | Beijing*, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Henan |
Table 1 Establishment of environmental supervision centers in China
Region | Establishment year | Coverage area |
---|---|---|
East | 2002 | Shanghai, Jiangsu*, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong |
South | 2002 | Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong*, Guangxi, Hainan |
Northwest | 2006 | Shaanxi*, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang |
Southwest | 2006 | Chongqing, Sichuan*, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet |
Northeast | 2006 | Liaoning*, Jilin, Heilongjiang |
North | 2008 | Beijing*, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Henan |
Variable name | Mean | S.D. | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PM2.5 | 35.111 | 16.130 | Average annual concentration of PM2.5 (μg m-3) |
ln (population) | 5.843 | 0.695 | Logarithm of total population (×104 person) |
Industry structure | 47.853 | 11.197 | The share of secondary industry in GDP |
ln (PGDP) | 15.512 | 1.053 | Per capita GDP |
FDI | 0.004 | 0.004 | Ratio of FDI to GDP |
Fiscal dependence | 0.081 | 0.045 | Ratio of fiscal revenue to GDP |
Urbanization | 0.352 | 0.190 | Ratio of non-agricultural population in total population |
ln (VC) | 7.353 | 0.294 | Average annual air flow coefficient |
SO2 | 0.031 | 0.120 | Industrial sulfur dioxide emissions per unit of GDP (t (×104 yuan)-1) |
ln (patent) | 5.821 | 1.838 | Number of invention patents authorized (pieces) |
ln (investment) | 6.279 | 1.723 | Investment completed in the treatment of waste gas |
Accidents | 37.960 | 65.562 | Number of environmental pollution accidents |
Table 2 Summary statistics and descriptions of variables
Variable name | Mean | S.D. | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PM2.5 | 35.111 | 16.130 | Average annual concentration of PM2.5 (μg m-3) |
ln (population) | 5.843 | 0.695 | Logarithm of total population (×104 person) |
Industry structure | 47.853 | 11.197 | The share of secondary industry in GDP |
ln (PGDP) | 15.512 | 1.053 | Per capita GDP |
FDI | 0.004 | 0.004 | Ratio of FDI to GDP |
Fiscal dependence | 0.081 | 0.045 | Ratio of fiscal revenue to GDP |
Urbanization | 0.352 | 0.190 | Ratio of non-agricultural population in total population |
ln (VC) | 7.353 | 0.294 | Average annual air flow coefficient |
SO2 | 0.031 | 0.120 | Industrial sulfur dioxide emissions per unit of GDP (t (×104 yuan)-1) |
ln (patent) | 5.821 | 1.838 | Number of invention patents authorized (pieces) |
ln (investment) | 6.279 | 1.723 | Investment completed in the treatment of waste gas |
Accidents | 37.960 | 65.562 | Number of environmental pollution accidents |
Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
---|---|---|---|
ESS | –1.629*** (0.266) | –1.024*** (0.317) | -1.192*** (0.317) |
ln (population) | 3.825 (1.981) | ||
Industry structure | 0.117*** (0.024) | ||
ln (PGDP) | -4.383*** (0.792) | ||
Fiscal dependence | -19.412*** (4.762) | ||
Urbanization | 4.929** (2.091) | ||
FDI | 42.851 (29.486) | ||
City fixed effects | NO | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | NO | YES | YES |
Observations | 4793 | 4793 | 4793 |
R2 | 0.934 | 0.950 | 0.951 |
Table 3 The effect of the environmental supervision system on PM2.5
Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
---|---|---|---|
ESS | –1.629*** (0.266) | –1.024*** (0.317) | -1.192*** (0.317) |
ln (population) | 3.825 (1.981) | ||
Industry structure | 0.117*** (0.024) | ||
ln (PGDP) | -4.383*** (0.792) | ||
Fiscal dependence | -19.412*** (4.762) | ||
Urbanization | 4.929** (2.091) | ||
FDI | 42.851 (29.486) | ||
City fixed effects | NO | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | NO | YES | YES |
Observations | 4793 | 4793 | 4793 |
R2 | 0.934 | 0.950 | 0.951 |
Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
---|---|---|---|---|
ESS | -1.719*** (0.342) | -2.171*** (0.350) | -1.596*** (0.273) | -1.769*** (0.273) |
Control variables | NO | YES | NO | YES |
City fixed effects | NO | YES | NO | YES |
Year fixed effects | NO | YES | NO | YES |
Observations | 2952 | 2952 | 4392 | 4392 |
R2 | 0.920 | 0.922 | 0.931 | 0.932 |
Table 4 The results excluding other policy influences (Model 1 and 2) and PSM-DID estimates (Model 3 and 4).
Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
---|---|---|---|---|
ESS | -1.719*** (0.342) | -2.171*** (0.350) | -1.596*** (0.273) | -1.769*** (0.273) |
Control variables | NO | YES | NO | YES |
City fixed effects | NO | YES | NO | YES |
Year fixed effects | NO | YES | NO | YES |
Observations | 2952 | 2952 | 4392 | 4392 |
R2 | 0.920 | 0.922 | 0.931 | 0.932 |
Variables | First step regression | Second step regression |
---|---|---|
ESS | PM2.5 | |
ln (VC)×post | 0.135*** (0.000) | |
ESS | -1.748*** (0.265) | |
Control variables | YES | YES |
City fixed effects | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | YES | YES |
Observations | 4793 | 4793 |
R2 | 0.964 | 0.546 |
F value | 33.12 |
Table 5 Instrumental variable estimations
Variables | First step regression | Second step regression |
---|---|---|
ESS | PM2.5 | |
ln (VC)×post | 0.135*** (0.000) | |
ESS | -1.748*** (0.265) | |
Control variables | YES | YES |
City fixed effects | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | YES | YES |
Observations | 4793 | 4793 |
R2 | 0.964 | 0.546 |
F value | 33.12 |
Variables | ln (patent) | SO2 | Industry structure | Accidents | ln (investment) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ESS | 1.125*** (0.037) | ‒0.005*** (0.001) | ‒0.596* (0.322) | ‒17.557*** (0.021) | 0.052** (0.021) |
Control variables | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
City fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Observations | 4793 | 4793 | 4793 | 4793 | 4793 |
R2 | 0.252 | 0.721 | 0.868 | 0.012 | 0.912 |
Table 6 Analysis of potential mechanisms
Variables | ln (patent) | SO2 | Industry structure | Accidents | ln (investment) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ESS | 1.125*** (0.037) | ‒0.005*** (0.001) | ‒0.596* (0.322) | ‒17.557*** (0.021) | 0.052** (0.021) |
Control variables | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
City fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Observations | 4793 | 4793 | 4793 | 4793 | 4793 |
R2 | 0.252 | 0.721 | 0.868 | 0.012 | 0.912 |
Variables | Station city | Non-station city |
---|---|---|
ESS | ‒1.593*** (0.489) | ‒1.349*** (0.318) |
Control variables | YES | YES |
City fixed effects | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | YES | YES |
Observations | 1308 | 3485 |
R2 | 0.898 | 0.944 |
Table 7 Heterogeneity analysis
Variables | Station city | Non-station city |
---|---|---|
ESS | ‒1.593*** (0.489) | ‒1.349*** (0.318) |
Control variables | YES | YES |
City fixed effects | YES | YES |
Year fixed effects | YES | YES |
Observations | 1308 | 3485 |
R2 | 0.898 | 0.944 |
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