Does the Environmental Supervision System Improve Air Quality in China? An Empirical Study using the Difference-in-Differences Model

doi:10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2021.05.001

Abstract

Abstract:

To effectively solve the problem of environmental pollution, the Chinese government has implemented an environmental supervision system since 2002. The environmental supervision system mainly uses the four functions of supervision, investigation, coordination, and emergency response to strengthen environmental protection supervision and law enforcement, respond to environmental emergencies, and coordinate cross-regional pollution disputes. As an important system design for China to control environmental pollution and promote the ecological transformation of economic development, the policy effect of the environmental supervision system deserves attention. This paper uses the difference-in-differences method to investigate the impact of the top-down environmental supervision system on air quality based on the 2000-2016 data for 285 prefecture-level cities in China. The results indicate that the annual average concentration of PM_2.5 decreased significantly after the implementation of the environmental supervision system. The dynamic analysis shows that PM_2.5 decreased most markedly in the first year after the implementation of the policy, and then the effect gradually weakened. Mechanism analysis suggests that the environmental supervision system can break the collusion between government and enterprise, encourage enterprises to carry out technological innovation, change pollutant discharge behavior and push local governments to adjust the industrial structure, enhance environmental protection awareness to reduce the PM_2.5 concentration, and improve air quality. Comparing different regions, the PM_2.5 in East China, North China and Northeast China are relatively high, and the pressure for air pollution control is great. Meanwhile, we find that the environmental supervision system has a significant station effect. Compared with other cities, the cities where the environmental supervision centers are located are more deterred by the environmental supervision, and their air quality has improved to a significantly greater degree. In the future, we should further strengthen the environmental supervision of high-pollution areas and non-station cities, and pay more attention to improving the long-term effect of the environmental supervision system.

Key words: environmental supervision system, air quality, PM_2.5, difference-in-differences model

CAO Zhiying, WANG Liangjian, WU Jiahao. Does the Environmental Supervision System Improve Air Quality in China? An Empirical Study using the Difference-in-Differences Model[J]. Journal of Resources and Ecology, 2021, 12(5): 581-592.

Figures/Tables 11

References 40

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Region	Establishment year	Coverage area
East	2002	Shanghai, Jiangsu*, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong
South	2002	Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong*, Guangxi, Hainan
Northwest	2006	Shaanxi*, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang
Southwest	2006	Chongqing, Sichuan*, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet
Northeast	2006	Liaoning*, Jilin, Heilongjiang
North	2008	Beijing*, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Henan

Region	Establishment year	Coverage area
East	2002	Shanghai, Jiangsu*, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong
South	2002	Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong*, Guangxi, Hainan
Northwest	2006	Shaanxi*, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang
Southwest	2006	Chongqing, Sichuan*, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet
Northeast	2006	Liaoning*, Jilin, Heilongjiang
North	2008	Beijing*, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Henan

Variable name	Mean	S.D.	Description
PM_2.5	35.111	16.130	Average annual concentration of PM_2.5 (μg m^-3)
ln (population)	5.843	0.695	Logarithm of total population (×10⁴ person)
Industry structure	47.853	11.197	The share of secondary industry in GDP
ln (PGDP)	15.512	1.053	Per capita GDP
FDI	0.004	0.004	Ratio of FDI to GDP
Fiscal dependence	0.081	0.045	Ratio of fiscal revenue to GDP
Urbanization	0.352	0.190	Ratio of non-agricultural population in total population
ln (VC)	7.353	0.294	Average annual air flow coefficient
SO₂	0.031	0.120	Industrial sulfur dioxide emissions per unit of GDP (t (×10⁴ yuan)^-1)
ln (patent)	5.821	1.838	Number of invention patents authorized (pieces)
ln (investment)	6.279	1.723	Investment completed in the treatment of waste gas
Accidents	37.960	65.562	Number of environmental pollution accidents

Variable name	Mean	S.D.	Description
PM_2.5	35.111	16.130	Average annual concentration of PM_2.5 (μg m^-3)
ln (population)	5.843	0.695	Logarithm of total population (×10⁴ person)
Industry structure	47.853	11.197	The share of secondary industry in GDP
ln (PGDP)	15.512	1.053	Per capita GDP
FDI	0.004	0.004	Ratio of FDI to GDP
Fiscal dependence	0.081	0.045	Ratio of fiscal revenue to GDP
Urbanization	0.352	0.190	Ratio of non-agricultural population in total population
ln (VC)	7.353	0.294	Average annual air flow coefficient
SO₂	0.031	0.120	Industrial sulfur dioxide emissions per unit of GDP (t (×10⁴ yuan)^-1)
ln (patent)	5.821	1.838	Number of invention patents authorized (pieces)
ln (investment)	6.279	1.723	Investment completed in the treatment of waste gas
Accidents	37.960	65.562	Number of environmental pollution accidents

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
ESS	–1.629^*** (0.266)	–1.024^*** (0.317)	-1.192^*** (0.317)
ln (population)			3.825 (1.981)
Industry structure			0.117^*** (0.024)
ln (PGDP)			-4.383^*** (0.792)
Fiscal dependence			-19.412^*** (4.762)
Urbanization			4.929^** (2.091)
FDI			42.851 (29.486)
City fixed effects	NO	YES	YES
Year fixed effects	NO	YES	YES
Observations	4793	4793	4793
R²	0.934	0.950	0.951