Journal of Resources and Ecology ›› 2019, Vol. 10 ›› Issue (1): 48-55.DOI: 10.5814/j.issn.1674-764X.2019.01.006

• Orginal Article • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Research on the Optimization of Capital for the Governance of Bulk Coal in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region

DU Xiaolin, FENG Xiangzhao*(), ZHAO Mengxue, WANG Min   

  1. Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy, Ministry of Ecology and Environment, Beijing 100029, China
  • Received:2018-08-05 Accepted:2018-11-21 Online:2019-01-28 Published:2019-01-28
  • Contact: FENG Xiangzhao
  • Supported by:
    National Environmental Protection Strategy Decision Support (2023040019).

Abstract:

Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei each contributed to the comprehensive governance of bulk coal to treat bulk coal pollution in a mutually beneficial way in 2017. The cooperative game theory is used in this paper to study the environmental benefits and cost effectiveness brought about by this comprehensive governance strategy, primarily focusing on the issue of how to maximize the environmental benefits by choosing an appropriate strategy since the benefits to Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei are closely related. Therefore, the linear optimization, game theory and Shapley value method in the cooperative game model are used to find the ways to minimize the total governance cost of bulk coal in the three areas. In addition, the issues of how to carry out rational distribution and transfer of governance capital among the three places are explored according to the actual amounts of consumption of bulk coal, the influence of the coal burning on the PM2.5 and the actual cost of coal governance in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei in 2017. The results show that the governance task in Hebei Province is the most onerous, and requires more investment than the other two cities. Thus, it requires the support from other two cities, with the amount of increased capital required of about 600 million Yuan. At the same time, the cost saved after optimization in Tianjin is calculated to be the largest, which thus can be adjusted appropriately and allocated to Hebei for the governance of bulk coal. The model constructed in this paper can not only be used to solve the issues related to bulk coal consumption in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, but also to carry out the effective distribution of capital, by which a win-win scenario among the three places can be achieved.

Key words: Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, bulk coal governance, cooperative game, Linear Optimization